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Abstract 
Policy priorities, which are set by political leaders, determine the economic-institutional 
environment in which financial actors operate. How investors react to changes in policies is, 
however, still an open issue. This thesis sets out to investigate how stock markets react to 
changes to the political leadership of a country. Few political events better illustrate 
uncertainty around future policies than changes in the executive leadership. Regardless, few 
political scientists have set out to describe and interpret the complex relationship between 
politics and finance. Using theories and methods from both economics and political science, 
this thesis seek to bridge the gap and bring a more holistic understanding of the link between 
politics and finance. The main argument in the thesis is that change in the political leadership 
affects markets by adding uncertainty around future policy, and therefore future cost and gain 
for investors. I assume that this will lead to lower returns and higher volatility in periods 
around when the de facto incumbent of a country is changed. In order to formalize my 
argument, I develop a game-theoretical model to explain the assumed behavior for investors 
in a framework of policy uncertainty.  
To measure financial markets performance I use national stock market indexes, and the 
data on political leaders are taken for the Archigos-dataset. The research design is a large-N 
quantitative study. In order to capture two different ways in which markets might react to 
these events, I test for effects of leadership changes on stock markets both in terms of their 
mean value and volatility. To do this I use two different statistical techniques: (1) an event 
study model and (2) a GARCH (1,1). The results from the analysis show that markets indeed 
react to political changes, but first and foremost with higher volatility. Higher volatility 
means that financial market values vary more in these periods of political transition. While 
the theoretical expectation is that also mean returns should be affected – as investors 
generally were expected to be “fearful” of political leadership changes - no statistical 
significant result are found in regard to this in the empirical analysis. Both of these results are 
stable and robust through different specifications.  
VI	   	  
 
	  	   VII	  
Acknowledgements 
Five years of university education, on three different universities (!), comes to an end with 
this thesis. It has been a fantastic journey and I am so very grateful for all the fantastic people 
I have met on my way, in Trondheim (NTNU), at the University of Glasgow, and now lastly 
at the University of Oslo.  
First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Carl Henrik Knutsen for 
guidance, discussions, and feedback during my work with this thesis. His patience, 
knowledge, and eye for details have been deeply appreciated. Moreover, I am thankful to Jon 
Hovi for comments on the game theoretical model in chapter 3. Also to BI business school, 
which gave me accesses to Datastream that provided the financial data used in this thesis.  
I would like to thank all my friends and family for encouragement and support during 
this hectic period of writing, you are all exempt from the “duty” of reading the whole thesis.  
Most importantly, I would like to thank Vivi for all her love and support, and for reading 
and commenting on the thesis, but most of all for just being who you are.  
Any remaining errors or omissions are solely my own! 
 
 
Word Count: 32 139 
VIII	   	  
  
	  	   IX	  
Contents 
1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 The structure of the thesis ......................................................................................... 2 
1.2 Why investigate how political change affect financial markets ............................. 2 
1.3 Challenges with doing empirical research on the topic .......................................... 5 
1.4 The main results from the empirical analysis .......................................................... 9 	  
2 Literature review ............................................................................................................. 10 
2.1 Effects of change in political leadership ................................................................. 11 
2.2 The basics of financial markets ............................................................................... 13 
2.2.1 Assumptions about financial markets .................................................................. 15 
2.3 Political change and financial markets ................................................................... 16 
2.3.1 Better the devil you know .................................................................................... 20 	  
3 Theoretical framework ................................................................................................... 22 
3.1 Summary of the theoretical argument .................................................................... 22 
3.2 The game-theoretic model ....................................................................................... 23 
3.2.1 Model 1: Full information .................................................................................... 25 
3.2.2 Model 2: Incomplete information ........................................................................ 28 
3.3 Institutions and Partisanship .................................................................................. 31 
3.3.1 Institutions ............................................................................................................ 31 
3.3.2 Partisanship .......................................................................................................... 35 
3.4 Developing economies .............................................................................................. 36 
3.5 Summary of the hypotheses. .................................................................................... 38 	  
4 Research design ............................................................................................................... 39 
4.1 Data ............................................................................................................................ 39 
4.2 A short introduction to assets price forecasting .................................................... 44 
4.3 Event study ................................................................................................................ 47 
4.4 GARCH-model ......................................................................................................... 48 	  	  	  
X	   	  
5 Empirical results ............................................................................................................. 53 
5.1 Event study analysis ................................................................................................. 53 
5.2 GARCH-model ......................................................................................................... 60 
5.2.1 Causality .............................................................................................................. 65 
5.3 Robustness-test ......................................................................................................... 67 
5.3.1 Event model ......................................................................................................... 67 
5.3.2 GARCH-tests ....................................................................................................... 69 
5.4 Summary and discussion of the main results ......................................................... 72 
5.4.1 Summing of evidence for the different hypotheses ............................................. 78 	  
6 Concluding remarks ........................................................................................................ 80 
6.1 Future research ......................................................................................................... 81 
6.2 Final remarks ............................................................................................................ 83 
 
Bibliography	  ..................................................................................................................................	  85	  
Appendix	  1:	  Proof	  for	  equations	  3.3	  .....................................................................................	  96	  
Appendix	  2:	  List	  of	  events	  used	  in	  the	  event	  analysis	  .....................................................	  97	  
Appendix	  3:	  List	  of	  events	  due	  to	  natural	  death	  of	  the	  sitting	  incumbent	  .............	  102	  
Appendix	  4:	  Alternative	  GARCH-­‐specifications	  ...............................................................	  103	  
Appendix	  5:	  Stata	  code	  .............................................................................................................	  105	  
 
 
	  	   XI	  
List of figures 	  
Figure 1.1: Policy Uncertainty Index ........................................................................................ 6 
Figure 1.2: US Policy Uncertainty Index vs. S&P500 .............................................................. 7 
Figure 1.3: Causal relationship .................................................................................................. 8 	  
Figure 2.1: Lula-meter ............................................................................................................. 21 	  
Figure 3.1: Good Incumbent .................................................................................................... 26 
Figure 3.2: Bad Incumbent ...................................................................................................... 27 
Figure 3.3: Full game with incomplete information ................................................................ 28 	  
Figure 4.1: Illustration of event study analysis. ...................................................................... 47 
Figure 4.2: Monthly returns for Finland and USA. 1970-2004 ............................................... 49 
Figure 4.3: Histogram dependent variable .............................................................................. 50 	  
Figure 5.1: Example from Great Britain .................................................................................. 56 
 
 
XII	   	  
List of tables 
 
Table 3.1: Payoffs investor ...................................................................................................... 24 
Table 3.2: Payoffs voters ......................................................................................................... 25 	  
Table 4.1: Countries and stock markets in the analysis ........................................................... 41 
Table 4.2: Summary statistics for main economic variables ................................................... 46 	  
Table 5.1: Summary statistics of R-squared after regression .................................................. 54 
Table 5.2: Event study regression in the month of power transitions ..................................... 55 
Table 5.3: Event study regression in the month of power transitions ..................................... 55 
Table 5.4: Event study analysis, USA vs. Spain ..................................................................... 57 
Table 5.5: Event study, intuitions and partisanship ................................................................. 58 
Table 5.6: Event study, developing countries ......................................................................... 59 
Table 5.7: GARCH (1,1). Event window ................................................................................ 61 
Table 5.8: GARCH(1,1). Institutions, partisanship, and developing countries ....................... 63 
Table 5.9: GARCH (1,1), with natural death of leader as independent variable ..................... 66 
Table 5.10: Event study with alternative event period (-2,+2) ................................................ 68 
Table 5.11: Event study, shorter event periods ....................................................................... 68 
Table 5.12: Event study analysis, constant mean return model .............................................. 69 
Table 5.13: GARCH (1,1) Alternative event window specification ....................................... 70 
Table 5.14: EGARCH (1,1) ..................................................................................................... 71 
Table 5.15: Hypotheses summarized ....................................................................................... 79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   1	  
1 Introduction 
 
[H]ow unrealistic any theory of investment opportunity is which leaves the political 
factor out of account. – Joseph A. Schumpeter (1939, 1043) 
 
On April 23th 2013 the Dow Jones Index fell with over 100 points between 1:08 pm and 1:10 
pm, a drop valued at approximately $136.5 billion (Reuters 2013). This was roughly the 
equivalent of the GDP of Vietnam in 20131. The incident happened after someone hacked the 
twitter account of an American news agency and reported two explosions at the White House 
(ElBoghdady 2013). The market quickly recovered after it was refuted. Still, this episode 
highlights the financial markets’ weakness to sudden political uncertainty. However, it is not 
only sudden political events that affect markets. Also, regular democratic elections have been 
shown to affect investor’s behavior and financial market outcomes. One example is India, 
where election periods have been observed to correlate with higher volatility for the rupee 
(The Economist 2013). With the expansive growth of global capital markets, any political 
uncertainty can become very expensive. Investors may, in turn, demand institutions that 
reduce politically created volatility. On the other hand, politicians have found themselves 
increasingly relying on stable financial markets to provide economic growth (Bernhard and 
Leblang 2006, 16), and therefore have an incentive to create an environment that encourages 
exactly that. The aim of this thesis is to further explore the complex relationship between 
political uncertainty and financial markets. 
This thesis will investigate how a change in a country’s de facto incumbent affects 
financial markets. By doing this, I will explore the underlying mechanisms between the 
political and business world. Drawing on theories and methods from both economics and 
political science, I try to bring forward a more holistic picture of this relationship than 
previous inquiries. The research design is a large-N study, but also draws on more case-
specific and historical evidence. While most previous studies have looked at this with a 
starting-point in democratic election, this thesis takes another approach by focusing directly 
at the incumbent and defines the event of interest as the time they leave or take office; in 
contrast to when they are elected. This allows me to incorporate all kinds of events that lead 
to change in a country’s incumbent. Also, this makes it possible to include regimes that do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 $ 138 billion (IMF) 
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not hold popular elections. The research question guiding this thesis is: How do changes in 
political leadership affect financial markets? 
I find in the empirical analysis that markets react to political change with higher 
volatility, but I find no statistical significant effect in regards to mean value. This implies that 
market value are not seen to be effect by periods of political change and the policy 
uncertainty that follows, but that markets experience higher volatility in these periods; I will 
get back to what volatility means in sections 2.2. 
 
1.1 The structure of the thesis 
This chapter, chapter 1, will briefly present my motivations for looking into this complex 
issue, and the relevancy of addressing this inquiry. It will also highlight some of the 
challenges with empirical research on this research question, and show where this thesis 
expands on the current literature. Chapter 2 will give a review of the previous academic 
literature on the field, and give a sense of the current debates on the subject. In chapter 3, the 
theoretical framework of the thesis is presented, and hypotheses are generated. As already 
mentioned, both theories from political science and economics are used. In addition, a game 
theoretical model is presented to formalize the main argument of the thesis. Chapter 4 is 
devoted to the research design, which will be a large-N quantitative design. Also, data and 
variables will be presented and discussed. Chapter 5 presents the main results and findings 
from the empirical analysis. This chapter will also contain robustness tests of the results. 
Chapter 6 concludes with a summary of the findings and suggestions for future research on 
the subject.   
 
1.2 Why investigate how political change affect financial 
markets 
Politics clearly influence the economy, even in states where the government role is limited to 
a “night watchman”. 2  Business and financial market actor’s work inside the limits set by 
politicians. Political leaders shape both institutions and laws that affect financial markets 
(Blondel 1987; Bragues 2010, 7; Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009; Jones and Olken 
2005, 836). A stable financial market, where investors can trade stock, bonds, and currency, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2 ”The night-watchman state of classical liberal theory, limited to the functions of protecting all its citizens 
against violence, theft, and fraud, and to the enforcement of contracts, and so on.” (Nozick 1974, 26) 
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is an important factor for a healthy national economy (Haber, North, and Weingast 2008; 
Lopez and Spiegel 2002). The link between politics and financial markets also becomes clear 
when looking into the coverage political events receive in financial magazines like The 
Economist and The Financial Times. With politics receiving much attention by financial 
actors, they presumably consider that the behavior and policy choices of politicians have an 
effect on the market. Since business actor’s work inside the framework set by the political 
leadership, in regards to both laws and institutions, their concern is fairly intuitive to 
understand. One of the political events that clearest bring about uncertainty around future 
policies are changes in the executive leadership. Outcomes of these events determine the 
future economic policy of governments, which in turn affect the environment that investors 
operate in. Following, the collective actions of investors affect the nature of how financial 
markets react to political events (Bernhard and Leblang 2006, 4). However, as already stated, 
politicians and incumbents have increasingly also started to rely on stable financial markets 
to boost economic growth and prosperity. Some countries have also grown more and more 
dependent on private investments to keep their economy growing, and because of this 
countries have increasingly pursued policies to attract foreign investors and keep those 
already present (Oatley 2012, 299–300). In a world of global financial markets, with ever 
fewer restrictions on international capital flow (Bechtel 2012), investors can easily change 
their portfolio investments to different countries if they so see fit.  
Still, it is clear that not every political change leads to frenetic market activity. 
Consequently, it is important to gather more information about how the mechanism between 
the political world and the world of financial markets work. Economists have long dominated 
the study of financial markets, and only a small interdisciplinary literature exists on how 
political processes affect financial markets (Bernhard and Leblang 2006, 5). Yet, after the 
economic crises of 2007-2008, Bragues (2010) argues that there is a need to encourage more 
inter-disciplinary research on how financial markets behave. Some of this lack in interest 
among political scientists might come down to lack of knowledge about what financial 
market are and how they operate.3 Therefore, section 2.2 goes through what financial markets 
are, and some common assumptions about how they operate. This gives the necessary 
background to understand the results and the current debate in the literature. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3 As Bernhard and Leblang (2006, 6) note: “our first paper on the topic came back from the review process with 
a rather unsubtle suggestion that we learn something about how markets actually work before putting anything 
in writing.”. 
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Another reason for financial market research being dominated by economists is that it 
fits nicely under the category as what “common sense construes as economic” (Bragues 
2010, 5). Still, it is clear that few, if any, questions in the social sciences lends itself to only 
one academic discipline. As popularized by the books Freakonomics (Levitt and Dubner 
2005) and the Undercover economist (Harford 2006), the economic methodology has been 
applied to questions about law, crime, and politics. However, few of the other social sciences, 
like political science and sociology, have stepped into the traditional domain of economics. I 
have already noted that politics shapes the framework in which financial markets operate, but 
also the most essential component of finance, money, is a political construct as it is 
manufactured, authenticated and distributed by the central banks (Bragues 2010).4  
The value of a healthy and stable national financial market is not to be underplayed. 
During and after the financial crises of 2007/2008, critical questions about financial markets 
were asked, and it became an increased focus on the negative externalities of the financial 
markets (Valdez and Molyneux 2013, 488). Many highlighted fundamental flaws in the 
systems, which resulted in necessary revision of the regulations on the market. However, 
many do not realize the important functions financial markets play in the overall state of the 
economy. As argued by Ferguson (2008, 15), “poverty is not the result of rapacious 
financiers exploiting the poor. It has much more to do with the lack of financial institutions, 
with the absence of banks, not their presence.”  
By setting prices, allocating recourses, allowing extra resources to be invested, and 
providing funds for business, financial markets in some sense grease and ease the way in 
which the national economy operates (Levinson 2010). It has also been shown that there is 
strong positive relationship between financial development and economic growth (Lopez and 
Spiegel 2002), and between financial development and the social well-being of a country’s 
populations (Haber, North, and Weingast 2008, 1). Some even propose that “the only way for 
poor countries to get rich is for them to provide incentives for capital (including capital 
devoted to health care and education) to be supplied to its most productive uses.” (Mishkin 
2009, 12). Illustrating the basic purpose of a functioning financial market, to allocated funds 
to where it is most needed. So, the point being that stable financial markets might be essential 
for social development and stable economic growth.  
One very important reason to investigate the relationship between finance and politics 
more closely is that the previous findings on this have been scant and mixed (Arin, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4 A notable exception is Bitcon, which is a peer-to-peer electronic currency that is not under any governments 
control (Reid and Harrigan 2013). 
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Molchanov, and Reich 2013). For example in regards to partisanship, Santa-Clara and 
Valknov (2003) finds, in contrast to the general perception, that stock market returns are 
higher under left-wing governments. In contrast, Leblang and Mukherjee (2005), claim to 
find the opposite; that returns are higher under right-wing executives. Also, there has been 
debate about when effects of elections occur. Some have found the effect to occur prior to 
elections (Pantzalis, Stangeland, and Turtle 2000), and some say it is more of lagged effect 
only occurring after the change has taken place (Vuchelen 2003). Together this brings 
uncertainty to what kind of mechanisms is at work under the relationship between politics 
and financial markets. In this thesis, I will draw on a broad array of contributions from 
different research traditions and apply different techniques in trying to answer the question in 
focus. In additions, a game-theoretical model will be developed to formalize the basic 
argument underlying the academic debate and help to get a clear view of what effect I am 
looking to find in the data through the analysis.  
 
1.3 Challenges with doing empirical research on the topic 
To highlight the importance of this research question and some of the challenges ahead, I 
present one current application of this insight. When the financial crises of 2007-2008 
materialized, people demanded new policies on a financial system that seemed out of control. 
As a result stricter controls and regulations where enforced; one prominent example being 
new capital ratio demands under Basel III (Valdez and Molyneux 2013). However, since 
these where new policies, uncertainty about their consequences where highlighted among 
commentators. As a way of assessing how policy uncertainty affects market value, Baker, 
Bloom, and Davis (2013) made an index measuring economic policy uncertainty, based on 
hand-coded newspaper articles. As shown in figure 1.1, it has spikes around events where 
policy uncertainty is high as close elections, the 9/11 attacks, and the Leman Bros. 
bankruptcy.  
Still, this index only exists for a handful of countries mainly because of the complex and 
time-consuming data collection using newspaper articles. The results and conclusions drawn 
from these data can, however, be very useful as a starting point for the question studied in 
this this thesis regarding the effect of political leadership changes. In figure 1.2, is the index 
plotted up against the US stock market data from November 2002 until August 2012, 
showing a clear correlation between these two parameters; the figure is taken from Gregory 
and Rangel (2012). Stock and Watson (2012) finds evidence, using this index, that policy 
6	   	  
uncertainty was one of the main reasons for the 2007-2009 recession in the US. Another 
example, more contradictory to previous research (and probably to common beliefs), is Li et 
al.’s (2013) conclusion that there only is a weak link between economic policy uncertainty 
and stock return in the emerging markets of China and India. This is surprising since in 
earlier research, as will be shown in the literature review in chapter 2, emerging markets have 
been seen to have stronger links between financial markets and policy uncertainty than more 
developed economies.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Policy Uncertainty Index (Baker, Bloom, and Davis 2013, 30)  
 
The index has also been used by economic analysis and market research done be major 
financial players like Goldman Sachs (Gregory and Rangel 2012), Deutsche Bank (Fishman 
et al. 2012), and even the Norwegian central bank (Aastveit, Natvik, and Sola 2013). As 
shown in figure 1.2, the correlations between the index and the US stock market is high, 
underlining the connections between policy uncertainty and stock markets (Gregory and 
Rangel 2012, 4).  
Still, visual inspections of graphs could give the wrong impression; it could be other 
events or mechanisms affecting one or both of the variables. In addition, this is only one 
country, and it is therefore difficult to draw generalizable conclusions on the basis of it. The 
research design in this thesis is a large-N quantitative study, which seeks to make 
generalizable conclusions by using a comprehensive dataset over a large number of countries. 
	   7	  
In contrast to earlier studies, I focus directly on the de facto incumbent and the time of 
change, instead of elections. This render possible an expansion in the number of events 
compared to earlier studies, since also change due to other factors than elections are taken 
into account. In addition, I use a relatively long time series, ranging from 1970 until 2004. In 
contrast to previous studies, this thesis also broadens the scope of the inquiry by including 
both democracies and autocracies, and developed and developing countries in the same study.  
 
Figure 1.2: US Policy Uncertainty Index vs. S&P500 (Gregory and Rangel 2012, 4) 
 
To explore different ways in which market may react to political change I use two 
different and complementary statistical models. The first is an event study analysis, which set 
out to measure abnormal returns in periods of political changes. The other is a GARCH-
model widely used in econometrics to look for excessive volatility in financial markets 
around the events of political leadership change.5 So, I set out both to measure how the mean 
returns in financial markets, and the variance or volatility in these same markets, are affected 
during periods of political transitions.  
As pointed out by Hatzius et al. (2012): “much of the increase in policy uncertainty is 
probably a consequence of economic weakness, rather than its cause”. This highlights one of 
the fundamental challenges with doing research into this problem, the directions of causality 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5 General Autoregressive Conditionally Heteroskedastic or GARCH-model is commonly used on time-serie's 
data from financial markets. They are used because the deal with a common problem in regards to high 
frequency data on financial markets; heteroskedasticity and especially clustering volatility (Baum 2006, 143–
144; Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 1997, 483). Visual inspection of, for instance, stock market data often 
reveals periods of high/low volatility clustered together (Brunner 2009, 160).  
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is far from indisputable. This will to some degree be tested and dealt with in the empirical 
analysis, using an event study model (chapter 4-5). But, most of all, this is a theoretical 
question, and chapter 3 will build the theoretical framework for the thesis. In the social 
science, judging whether causality is present, over and above having a mere correlation 
between two variables, will ultimately be a theoretical question, since causality cannot be 
observed directly and statistical models only capture co-variance (I have discussed these 
issues earlier in Osa 2012a, 5–6). To formalize my theoretical argument, I will also build a 
game theoretical model to mare precisely illustrate the proposed relationship between the 
variables in the analysis.  
The event study analysis utilized in this thesis is a counterfactual analysis, which tries to 
estimate financial market performance if the leader change had not occurred. By doing this, 
the method tries to mimic the control of the experimental method. Since I cannot get the same 
kind of control in the GARCH-specification, I here deploy a type of leadership change that 
cannot be effected by the movement in financial markets; namely changes due to the natural 
death of a nations incumbent.  
However, to believe that financial markets or economic factors do not affect political 
events would be naive. Since it is clear that financial markets also could affect political 
change, as economic factors are very likely to influence political processes (see e.g. 
Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Poor performance in financial markets could hurt the 
domestic economy, and it has been shown that the state of the economy affects elections and 
could force change in a countries political leadership (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2009). For 
instance, as findings from Bernhard and Leblang (2006, 15) indicate, an unstable financial 
market can reduce the chance for re-elections. Given that a valid controlled experiment is 
difficult to conduct, the casual link, and directions of it, will always be an area for scientific 
debate. Thus, I add this precaution, and its implications will be discussed further later in the 
thesis. The assumed causal link is illustrated in figure 1.3.  
 
 
Figure 1.3: Causal relationship 
 
 
Change	  in	  political	  leadership	   Financial	  market	  output	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1.4 The main results from the empirical analysis 
Before presenting my main findings in the thesis, I will shortly explain my main argument. 
This will, of course, be elaborated on through the literature review and theoretical framework 
in the two following chapters. Change in the political leadership leads to uncertainty around 
future policy. In turn, have policy uncertainty been seen to affect financial actors actions, as 
they know less about future gains and costs of their investments. I assume, an will elaborate 
on this future in the coming chapters, that political change lead to lower mean value of 
markets and higher volatility in these periods of political leadership change. In chapter 3 were 
the theoretical framework is presented, a game theoretical model is developed to formalize 
this argument. In additions to this main argument, I also present factors and indicators that 
might affect this relationship. Firstly, institutional factors that might reduce the policy 
uncertainty around a new incumbent, like regime type and central bank independence. 
Secondly, partisanship of the new incumbent, where conventional wisdom dictates that 
financial actors prefer right-wing candidates to left-wing alternatives. Lastly, as already 
mentioned, the relationship between policy uncertainty and financial markets seem to be 
stronger and less ambiguous in the developing countries. Leading to the assumption that this 
country type experience lower returns and higher volatility in these periods compared to the 
more industrialized economies.  
In the empirical analysis, I find that political change does not affect the mean value of 
financial market across all countries. However, I do find that individual countries show 
extremely different reactions, some show negative abnormal returns while others have 
positive abnormal returns, through periods of political transitions. Nonetheless, I do uncover 
that periods of political change are correlated with higher volatility in markets; indicating that 
prices varies a lot in these periods. The results are robust across model specifications. Other 
results indicate that countries with an independent central bank have higher mean returns in 
periods of political change, compared to those that do not have an independent institutions 
dealing with monetary policy. Also, democracies seem to create lower volatility than 
autocratic regimes. In contrast, does developing countries experience more volatility in 
financial markets around these events. This leads to the not very surprising conclusion that 
developed democracies have the most stable financial markets.  Still, even controlled for 
these factors, periods of political transitions are associated with higher volatility across 
country types.  	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2 Literature review 
 
Scholars need to take a final and decisive step in accepting that, in empirical and 
conceptual terms, the state and the market are part of the same, integrated system of 
governance; a state-market condominium. (Underhill 2000, 794) 
 
The link between financial markets and politics is far from a new phenomenon. Fergusson 
(2008), an economic historian, argues that the origin of several major political events, for 
example the French revolution, can be traced back to stock market bubbles. However, it has 
also been argued that the causality link goes the other way, as will be the main argument of 
this thesis. How stock markets are affected by war and political crises has been reviewed by 
the previous literature (Berkman and Jacobsen 2006; Schneider and Troeger 2006). Also, 
more specific events have been investigated, like the Arab spring (Chau, Deesomsak, and 
Wang 2014) and socio-political instability from organized crime in Colombia (Laverde, 
Varua, and Garces-Ozanne 2009). Both of these are shown to greatly effect stock market 
returns in respectively the Arab world and Colombia. These are extreme situations where the 
political uncertainty is high, but also more common and predictable political events, such as 
democratic elections, can cause abnormalities in the financial market. William Bernhard and 
David Leblang (2006), for example, use a large dataset over OECD countries to show how 
the stock, bond, and currency market respond to political change through election, cabinet 
formation and dissolution. As political leaders, in both democracies and autocracies, set the 
framework in which financial markets actors operate, investors do what they can to predict 
the outcomes in periods of leadership change. Jones and Olken (2005) finds that leaders 
matter a great deal for economic growth and development in countries and that leadership 
transitions are related to shifts in growth rates. It is worth noting that they find the effect to be 
stronger for power transactions in autocracies than democracies.  
The literature review that follows will be split in three. Firstly, I will go through previous 
findings of the effects of change in political leadership. A literature mostly based in political 
science, but I will also draw on research from sociology, history and economics. Secondly, 
financial markets will be defined, and standard assumptions about how the market operates 
will be presented. Lastly, the small, but growing, interdisciplinary literature on political 
leadership change and financial markets will be presented. I will also highlight one special 
case, which has been widely used in the previous literature, namely Brazil and the election 
and re-elections of President Lula. 
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2.1 Effects of change in political leadership 
The role of influential individuals in shaping history is debated. One branch sees leaders, or 
individuals, as having little effect on historical outcomes. For example, in Tolstoy’s historical 
theory leaders are merely seen as figureheads for events that are beyond any individuals 
influence (Berlin 1988). Karl Marx (1897) leaves some role for the agency of leaders, but 
argues that they their choices are severally limited by historical deterministic constraints.6 
Many academics are still affected by Marx thoughts, and see social and economic forces 
trumping the role of individual leaders (See Blackledge 2006). On the other side, have some 
seen leaders as the deceive component for history. In this view history comes down to the 
impact of particular individuals; as exemplified by John Keenan’s (1998) claim that: “the 
political history of the 20th century can be written as the biographies of six men”. 7 Such 
extreme opposite views lead to a diverse and broad middle ground.8 Still, one of Max 
Weber’s (1947) argument might be of special interest for this thesis. Weber argues that 
individuals matter but only if certain institutional circumstances are in place, as different 
political systems differ in how it allows or facilitate leaders to form policy based on own 
personal viewpoints.  
In economics and political science, institutions is an important explanatory variable in 
the study of economic variables and performance (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; 
Knutsen 2011a; North 2000). Even though this literature has mostly focused on economic 
growth, some have also looked into political institutions effect on financial markets (e.g. 
Haber, North, and Weingast 2008). North (1990, 3) defined political institutions as “the rules 
of the game”. He argues that good intuitions would protect private contracts and provides 
checks against extremes policies, for example expropriation of assets. There are many types 
of institutions that make it difficult for a new government to immediately turn the state 
system upside-down. One example that might be especially prominent is the independence of 
central banks; moving the responsibility for monetary politics from the politicians to an 
independent body (Bernhard and Leblang 2006, 5). Institutions might also define the number 
of veto players in the political structure, creating checks and balances in the system. Both of 
this and other institutional rules, might limit the freedom that a new leader has in putting new 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6 In Marx (1897, 5) own words: ”Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do 
not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted 
from the past.” 7 These are Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Mao, Roosevelt, and Churchill. 8 For a discussion on this see Berlin (1978)	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policy into effect. Again the struggle between the relative powers of individuals versus the 
system becomes clear.  
In political science, the focus in the last few decades has mostly been on the system 
instead of the individuals. However, the focus on leaders as an explanatory variable seem to 
be going through a renaissance, now being more frequently used by all sub-disciplines in 
political science (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009, 270). In comparative politics has 
the weight of these studies “rather naturally focused on political elites and their role in the 
political process.” (Peters 2008, 54). Barber (2009) for instances, argue that based on a 
person’s character and worldview, is it possible to predict their performance as a political 
leader. To show this, he divides American presidents along two scales: Active-Passive and 
Positive-Negative, giving four possible “types” of Presidents. Another comparative example 
comes from Dreher et al. (2009); they look at leaders educational and professional experience 
in regards to their ability to implement reforms. They find that former entrepreneurs and 
professional scientists are better and more efficient in promoting reforms, and especially left-
wing entrepreneurs compared to a right-wing leaders with the same professional background. 
However, the result of a leader's educational background is not found to be significant in the 
study.  
Also in the study of voting behavior have leaders received more attention lately than in 
the classic theories on this subject (Blais 2013; Hayes and McAllister 1997).9  Blais (2013, 4-
5) finds two interlinked factors for this development: (1) the personalization’s of politics, and 
(2) the decline of partisan loyalties. Nonetheless, in the last few years the idea of leaders as 
an explanatory variable has also gained more interest in the study of international relations 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Chiozza and Goemans 2003; Marinov 2005). One reason for 
the growing interest is that more prevailing explanatory variables, as institutions, regime type 
and legal system, change to slowly to account for more dynamic phenomenon’s such as 
conflict and international financial stability (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009, 271). 
One influential contribution to using leaders as an explanatory variable comes from 
Jones and Olken (2005). They test the claim that political leaders affect economic growth 
rates. However, before testing this they present a solution to the causality problem; 
“leadership transitions are often non-random, and may in fact be driven by underlying 
economic conditions.” (Jones and Olken 2005, 836). They solve this by applying a type of 
change that is not affected by economic conditions: transitions due to natural death of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9 Two of the important classical theories: (1) The Michigan School, that focuses on political parties and voter 
identifications; (2) The economic voter theorem, that focus on issues (Blais 2013). 
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incumbent. They find 57 of these events post World War II, and run a regression on this data, 
with economic growth as the dependent variable. The results show robust evidence for 
leaders affect on growth levels. However, they also analyze differences between democracies 
and autocracies, and find that the effect is strongest in an autocratic setting. They argue that 
this effect is present due to fewer restraints on the executive. As a further expansion of these 
findings, Besley, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2011) explore the same problem but also 
include the leaders` education and test whether this can explain the effect leaders give 
economic performance. They expand the time frame and get 215 events in their study. Their 
results imply that economic growth rates are higher under leaders that have higher education, 
further indicating the importance of leader on economic issues.  
 
2.2 The basics of financial markets 
 
One of the funny things about the stock market is that every time one person buys, 
another sells, and both think they are astute – William Feather10 
 
Given that this is a thesis in political science, some basic attributes about what the financial 
market is, and how it operates should be included. It will also later go through some standard 
assumptions from economics about financial markets, and how values and prices are decided 
in the market. This is important to understand the background for the statistical model used, 
and to get the current debate in the literature. Lastly I will shortly clarify what type of market 
reactions we expect to find from political change. It will, obviously, be underlined and 
formulated further in the theoretical framework of the thesis.    
A market is, in its easiest form, an arena for bringing together buyer and sellers, and to 
allow them to trade goods. A financial market is then an arena for the exchange of financial 
goods. Bragues (2010), in order to explain what a financial good are, he offers a simple 
comparison to a real good. Real goods are something that satisfy human needs or desires; like 
food, shelter, or clothing. However, financial goods only do this indirectly; for example you 
cannot eat a stock option or a coin. Still, both of these have the potential to be turned into a 
meal. “As such, financial goods represent future, contingent claims on resources.” (Bragues 
2010, 13). Additionally, financial markets are also about distribution; “matching of those who 
want capital (borrowers) with those who have it (lenders).” (Valdez and Molyneux 2013, 3). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10 http://www.searchquotes.com/quotation/   
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The most basic financial good is money. It represents an object that is always taken in 
exchange, usually inside a given territory. Still, most currencies can today be traded, making 
it also an item with a foreign exchange value. The other financial goods are themselves 
expressed in monetary terms. They include: shares (stocks) 11, bonds, derivatives, and 
commodities. I will focus on the two first, as these are the most common and familiar 
financial goods and is, in additions to foreign exchange markets, the most common 
measurement of financial market performance in academic literature.  
To buy a share means to buy a part of a company. When that company increases its 
earnings, the investor who brought their shares profits. A stock exchange, or a stock market, 
is an arena for the selling and buying of these shares. Since it is often not the same people 
who innovate and have money to make it happen, stock markets make it possible for people 
with extra money to put that into companies or ideas they believe will be profitable. It also 
opens the door for speculations, as it is possible in the market to buy something that you 
believe can be worth more in the future and sell assets you believe is overpriced. In the 
following analysis the state of the financial market are measured through national stock 
market indexes.  
Even though I do not use bond-data in this thesis, it is important to have an idea of what 
it is as others have utilized this as a proxy for financial markets behavior. While a share buys 
a part of company, a bond is a loan. A bond is a contract that tells how much the issuer owes 
the buyer in regards to interest and principal payment according to particular terms. Bonds 
are never the only source of obtaining funds for an entity, but are a way to diversify the 
source of funds, as there are limits to how much a company or a government can borrow 
from a bank (Sharpe, Alexander, and Bailey 1995). Some previous studies have utilized data 
on bonds in measuring performance in financial markets; still, the focus here will be on stock 
markets indexes. It is partly due to the data available, both in time and across countries, but 
also because stock markets are the most widely used measure in previous literature. I will go 
in to more detail about this decision when the data are described in section 4.1.   
Another important concept is volatility in financial markets. Volatility refers to the 
degree to which financial prices fluctuate, and is a key concept in forecasting and analyzing 
financial data. By looking at the movement of historical prices investors can get an idea of 
the amount of risk involved. For stock markets or currencies, higher volatility is associated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11 In today's financial world, the terms ”stocks” and ”shares” are used interchangeably. However, while in 
British English, the term “stock” is frequently used to describe either share or bonds; “ while shares is only used 
to refer to shares in companies, stocks is a much vaguer term.” (Valdez and Molyneux 2013, 202). Still, it is 
common to use the word “stock exchange” for a market where shares can be bought and sold.  
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with more uncertainty and therefore higher risk (Visser 2009). Several previous studies have 
calculated volatility around elections to grasp the effect politics have on markets (Alberg, 
Shalit, and Yosef 2008; Brunner 2009; Chau, Deesomsak, and Wang 2014; Leblang and 
Bernhard 2006; Leblang and Mukherjee 2004; Lobo and Tufte 1998). This is usually done 
using an ARCH or GARCH-model. In a GARCH specification the volatility is calculated 
using the standard deviations of the return (Visser 2009).  
In additions to volatility, I am also interested in measuring if the market receives a 
positive or negative reaction in value due to political events. Following some previous studies 
(Bernhard and Leblang 2006; Campello 2007), I utilize an event study model to look for an 
effect on stock market value. The intuition behind this model builds on the idea of relative 
efficiency, how markets preformed compared to a benchmark. This gives us the opportunity 
to calculate abnormal returns around periods of political change; returns not predicted by the 
benchmark. It allows me to look at two important sides of how political events can affect 
markets, and I will in the next chapter set up of different hypotheses based on these two 
different aspects of movements in stock market value. Both of these statistical methods will 
be further described and explained in chapter 4. 
 
2.2.1 Assumptions about financial markets 
 
There is an old joke, widely told among economists, about an economist strolling 
down the street with a companion. They come upon a $100 bill lying on the ground, 
and as the companion reaches down to pick it up, the economist says, ‘Don’t bother 
– if it were a genuine $100 bill, someone would have already picked it up’. (Lo 
2007, 1) 
 
The quote above captures the essence of one standard assumption in economics, that markets 
are efficient. The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) strictly states that prices and values 
reflect all available and relevant information (Malkiel and Fama 1970). Markets are here seen 
to follow what is called a random walk, “that is, changes in asset prices will occur randomly 
since asset prices already reflect the relevant information available to traders.” (Bernhard and 
Leblang 2006, 8). Following, nothing can be won by information based trading since that 
profit already is picked up, like the $100 bill (Lo 2007, 3). It is important to note that random 
in no way mean that prices movement has to happen smoothly (Campbell, Lo, and 
MacKinlay 1997, 22–23). “Randomness means that a series of small upward movements (or 
small downwards movements) is very unlikely. If the price is going to move up, it should 
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move up all at once, rather than in a series of small steps” (Black (1971) cited in Campbell, 
Lo, and MacKinlay 1997, 23). 
However, as this might all hold up in theory, some empirical observations are difficult to 
explain under the EMH. For instants, there are examples of investors beating the market over 
a long period, maybe the best and most prominent example being Warren Buffet (Chirkova 
2012). There are also what is known as calendar effects, abnormal returns around for 
example the end of the week or holidays (Lakonishok and Smidt 1988; Sullivan, 
Timmermann, and White 2001). These observations question the explanatory power of the 
assumption that financial markets follow a random walk. After decades of debate among 
economists about how efficient or inefficient markets are, no census is reached. One of the 
reasons is the difficulty in testing this assumption empirically, mainly because an assumed 
equilibrium model might be incorrect, and therefore in itself cause the abnormal returns. 
Campbell, Lo, and Mackinlay (1997, 24) rather suggest focusing on relative efficiency; the 
efficiency of one market measured against another. As Lo (2007, 13) claims: “the EMH is an 
idealization that is economically unrealizable, but which serves as a useful benchmark for 
measuring relative efficiency.”  
For the idea proposed in this thesis, this assumption has an important effect. If it holds 
true, only sudden or unpredictable leadership change would effects markets (Bernhard and 
Leblang 2006, 9). All other information should be reflected in market prices. The idea of 
relative efficiency is an important idea to keep in mind when I specify the model to be used 
in the empirical analysis; especially the model used for prices setting the market, the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) and the arbitrage pricing theory (APT). These will be presented 
in sections 4.2 and is the base of my regression analysis.  
 
 
2.3 Political change and financial markets 
 
The worst possible outcome for the stock market is that it takes a month to decide 
the elections – Jason Schenker12 	  
The literature on links between political change and financial markets are growing. It might 
be because political science as a discipline have moved into the turf of what is commonly 
seen as economics; namely the study of financial markets. Another reason may be that after 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12 http://voices.yahoo.com/20-funny-stock-market-quotes-6432950.html  
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the recent financial crises politics suddenly seems to matter much more for business actors 
and vice versa. Even in the US, where the mantra for many years was to separate government 
and Wall Street, a republican government had to buy AIG, the largest insurance company in 
the US at the time. Another example is the euro-crises and the default of the Greek economy. 
As Angela Merkel put it: “it’s a battle of the politicians against the markets…” (cited in 
Bragues 2010:3). Just a few years before, on September 11, 2001 a terrorist attack caused 
chaos in the worlds financial markets. Few would be surprised that sudden and unpredictable 
event affect prices, and that national and global event can have wide-ranging consequences. 
Berkman and Jacobsen (2006) confirm this idea in their study War, Peace and the Stock 
Market. By looking at international crises between 1918-2002, they find that these events 
reduce world market stock return by approximately four percent per annum. They also find 
that it not only affected the mean return, but also the volatility of world markets.  
Political uncertainty is a hurdle for investors and financial actors. Rodrik finds that 
policy reforms affect private investment, because of the uncertainty around future policies 
and their result. “Even moderate amount of policy uncertainty can act as a hefty tax on 
investments…” (Rodrik 1991, 230). He claims this effect is present even when entrepreneurs 
are risk-neutral. It could have important implications, as reforms are less likely to succeed 
without investments, simultaneously as investments are harder to realize when policy 
uncertainty is present. The conclusion of this might be that “uncertainty thereby created may 
well outweigh the beneficial effects of the reform.” (Rodrik 1991, 235). Bittlingmayer (1998) 
uses Germany before and after World War I as a natural experiment to test the way stock 
markets react to political uncertainty. He shows that the volatility was significantly lower 
during the stable political situation in imperial Germany, compared to the fractioned political 
landscape of the Weimar Republic. Also, evidence from the Great Depression shows that the 
political uncertainty was the source of a substantial part of the stock market volatility in this 
era (Voth 2002).  Schwert (1989) asked the question: “Why does stock market volatility 
change over time?”, something latter called “the volatility puzzle”. The finding of Berkman 
and Jakobsen (2006), Bittlingmayer (1998), and Voth (2002) indicated that political 
uncertainty might be an important variable to solve this puzzle.  
Still, it is not only crises or extreme circumstances that trigger these political 
uncertainties. Also more predictable events, like democratic elections, have been seen to 
affect financial market output. The most prominent and extensive look into this is Bernhard 
and Leblang’s (2006) book Democratic Processes and Financial Markets. Utilizing a wide 
range of methods and theories, they quite convincingly build the argument that democratic 
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elections and cabinet formations affect financial markets. They also test their results with 
several proxies for financial markets output: stock markets, bond markets, and currency 
exchange rates. Their analysis is based on up to 15 different democracies, and they also 
present more case based documentation from the US and UK markets. The results show that 
markets are relatively calm through predictable changes, based on poll data, but 
unpredictable changes lead to lower returns and higher volatility in national financial 
markets. 
Another recent addition to this inter-disciplinary research is Javier Santiso’s (2013) book 
Banking on Democracy. While Bernhard and Leblang (2006) focus on the OCED-countries 
and what is usually called the developed economies, Santiso investigate the same effects in 
emerging markets with a special focus on Latin America. He argues that, theoretically, the 
same mechanisms work between politics and financial markets in both developed and 
emerging economies but that the effect of political uncertainty is bigger and easier to detect 
in developing countries. Also, in contrast to Bernhard and Leblang (2006), Santiso (2013) 
mostly focus on portfolio investments as a measurement for financial markets performance. 
However, others have also utilized these kinds of data. Julio and Yook (2012) finds that 
elections years on average reduces the investment expenditures of firms by 4,8%, compared 
to non-election years. “In particular, the incentives and uncertainties associated with possible 
changes in government policy or national leadership have implications for the behavior of 
both politicians and firms.” (Julio and Yook 2012, 1). It leads to the conclusions that: 
“Investors tend to value the status quo, at least in terms of policies, and democracies actually 
pay a price for the change that they inherently bring.” (Santiso 2013: 154). Accordingly, Frot 
and Santiso (2010) asks if it exists a democratic premium; since in the “past decades nearly 
all the major financial crises in developing countries have occurred in synchronization with 
electoral cycles” (Frot and Santiso 2010). Democracies do inherently give room for policy 
uncertainty in the sense that people may change their mind about what they want or need, and 
with that “make it more difficult for economic actors to predict future policy choices.” 
(Leblang and Bernhard 2006, 70).  
Not only elections, but also cabinet formations have created instability in financial 
markets. Brunner (2009) investigate the Netherlands, and find that also periods after the 
elections result can create volatile markets until the cabinet negations are clear. In multi-party 
systems these periods can potentially be very long, as is often the case in the Netherlands. 
Bernhard and Leblang (2006, 49–85) test this on a broader scale, using data from 15 
parliamentary democracies and checking for an effect both in the stock and bond market. 
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They find, not surprisingly, that periods of political predictability reduce the negative 
abnormal return of both the stock and bond markets. An upcoming election or during 
collation negations, the political predictability for the market is reduced.  
Except from Bernhard and Leblang (2006), none of the studies above utilizes currency 
exchange rates as measurement on financial markets. However, currency markets are also a 
financial entity affected by politics. “[W]hen a period of learning is required before the new 
policy becomes fully credible then the foreign exchange market may appear irrational ex 
post.” (Christodoulakis and Kalyvitis 1997, 368). Blomberg and Hess (1997) specifies a 
model that take into account political event and compare it to a model based on a random-
walk. They find that the political model is better at predicting out-of-sample exchange rate 
between some of the world largest currencies. Using a modified GARCH-model, Lobo and 
Tufte (1998) present evidence that also weekly volatility of currencies is higher during 
election years. Leblang and Bernhard (2006) utilizes two forms of modified GARCH-model, 
an EGARCH and FEGARCH, to look at exchange rate volatility around elections in France, 
the UK, Belgium, and Sweden. Using daily data from the 1980s onwards they “find that 
periods of potential political change do often have an effect on exchange rate volatility” 
(Leblang and Bernhard 2006, 90). They also establish that being tied do a currency peg, as 
the EMU, removes this volatility as it restrains politician's effect over currency values.  
The literature has not only focused on an aggregated national level, but also on firm’s 
reactions to political change. Faccio and Parsley (2007) analyze how sudden deaths of 
political leaders affect firms from the politicians home region. In their worldwide study, they 
find that a politician’s sudden death leads to, on average, a drop of 1.7% in value of 
companies from that politician’s hometown. They also note that the average cumulative 
abnormal returns is negative in 60% of the cases (Faccio and Parsley 2007, 689). Also, firms 
with special connections to the politician, for example, close family ties or by being former 
employer, have additional negative as a consequence of the death. In contrast to this thesis, 
Faccio and Parsley only looks at death of politicians, not any other forms of losing power. 
They also use all kinds of politicians while I only utilize the de facto incumbent of countries. 
In addition is their focus on firms, not countries. Still, their results indicate how the market 
can change the values on firms in the face of political uncertainty.  
As the awareness of political uncertainty’s affect on financial markets have grown, more 
and more research go into how economies deal with this risk. Mattozzi (2008) has even 
proposed a way of hedging against political uncertainty in the US stock market. It is also 
evident from the policy uncertainty index presented earlier, and the attentions received from 
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both commercial actors and government entities (ref. section 1.1.1). The evaluation of 
political risk has always been important for investors and companies wanting to invest in 
international markets (Jakobsen 2012). However, not only markets actors need to be aware of 
these effects. Also, policy makers and international monetary actors like the World Bank and 
IMF needs to be aware of the consequences of political uncertainty on financial markets, as 
they play a role in reducing uncertainty and present clear and credible policy solutions. It is 
important to note that the relationship between politicians and markets actors “are 
complicated by the extreme slowness of reaction times in the realm of national political 
leadership, as compared to the almost instantaneous speed of adjustment in currency and 
money market.” (Whitehead 2003, 12) 
 
2.3.1 Better the devil you know 
Some key cases reappear in the literature on the connection between politics and financial 
markets. One of these is Brazil and the elections and re-election of Lula (Campello 2007; 
Jensen and Schmith 2005; Martínez and Santiso 2003). For example is Brazil the only 
country to be given its own chapter in Santiso’s (2013) book. The case of Brazil offers a 
perfect illustration of how politics and markets interact, which is one of the main arguments 
in this dissertation. Being one of the fastest growing economies in the last decade and a 
member of the so-called BRIC-countries, Brazil has become an important economic 
benchmark.13 In addition, Brazil highlights one of main arguments for this thesis: markets are 
driven by the uncertainty around new policy, not the uncertainty around elections in it self. 
Before the 2002 presidential election, many financial actors feared the election of Lula as 
the left-wing candidate (Jensen and Schmith 2005). Goldman Sachs even made a Lula-meter 
(figure 2.1) to monitor the downfall of the Brazilian real towards the US dollar, up against 
Lula’s standing in the public polls (Maxwell 2002). Also, the stock market was affected. In 
the period before the 2002 elections, the Brazilian stock market fell 52%, compared to 8% 
fall in emerging market indexes (Campello 2007, 2). Still, by the time of the next election, in 
2006, economic indicators seemed to react positively to the idea of Lula being re-elected 
(Nieto-Parra and Santiso 2009a, 2009b). By 2006, Lula had managed to reduce the amount of 
government debt and accumulate a large foreign reserve. In total, the market responded well 
to Lula`s policy between 2002 and 2006. So in addition to being a known entity, Lula`s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13 As an example of this: ”The Brazilian JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI+) is a common 
measure of emerging markets` country risk.” (Campello 2007, 2)  
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policy had also lead to good economic development, proving for financial actors the effect of 
his policy.  
 
Figure 2.1: Lula-meter (Maxwell 2002) 
 
Not knowing consequences of forthcoming policy priorities goes to the core of what 
financial actors dislike; uncertainty about the future. Before the 2002 election many feared 
that the socialist-candidate, Lula, would rack the national economy of the fast-growing 
Brazil. But by 2006, they knew him, and the uncertainty was around his opponent’s policies 
and how it would affect the economy. As discussed, the political leadership of a country sets 
the rules by which financial markets operate, and a change in leadership brings about some 
uncertainty in regards to change in those rules. Even small policy changes have been proven 
to potentially have dramatic effect on economic growth and development (Jones and Olken 
2005; Rodrik 1991). These changes could affect macroeconomic variables, as unemployment 
and inflation, or it could lead to modification of the national regulatory framework. Financial 
actors, therefore, have an incentive to filter out the relevant political information to predict 
such change and adjust prices accordingly. However, different investors may hold diverging 
expectations about future policy of the new government. As a consequence, can unexpected 
news in periods of political change lead to “change in the variance (volatility) and change in 
the mean (prices).” (Brunner 2009, 153). The main argument in this thesis can therefore be 
summed up to: Lula might be a socialist, but better the devil you know. It is the uncertainty 
around a new leader, and his or her policies, which affect markets in times of political 
change. It could affect both the value of financial assets and the variations in its prices. I will 
underline this further in the game-theoretical model in the next chapter.  
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3 Theoretical framework 
 
In this section, the theoretical background for the thesis is built. As stated by Moses and 
Knutsen (2007, 43): “Without theory, we fumble helplessly around in the dark.”, and this 
chapter will try and provide a torch to bring through the dark depths of the data material. To 
put it more explicitly, without theory, we do not now what we are looking for in the empirical 
data. Since it is a complex causal link to investigate, the importance of sound and clear theory 
is magnified. Theory also has the advantage that it highlights the dependent and independent 
variables for the analysis, and establishes the assumed causal link between these. This chapter 
will also generate hypotheses from the presented theory. Each hypothesis will be divided into 
two different aspect in regards to how markets will react: one relating to the assumed change 
in the mean return value of the market, and one related to volatility.  
The first part of this chapter will be devoted to the game theoretical model. There are 
three clear motivational factors for using a game theory in social science: (1) brings about a 
clear idea of what to look for in research on social problems; (2) has a very precise system of 
concepts, and (3) it render possible the use of formal arguments (Hovi 2008, 14–15). The 
model will first and foremost generate the main hypotheses for the thesis, but also be used to 
underline some of the supporting hypotheses to be tested in the empirical analysis. After this, 
two topics for explaining and nuance the effect political change is assumed to have on 
financial markets are presented: (1) Institutions and (2) political partisanship. Lastly, 
hypotheses concerning if country’s are seen as developed or developing economically will be 
generated. Firstly, the theoretical argument will be reviewed in words, before the formal 
account of the argument is presented.  
 
3.1 Summary of the theoretical argument 
Before I pursuit with a formal account of the theoretical argument, I will shortly summarize 
this argument in words. Policy, which is set by the political leadership of a country, provides 
a framework for business actors. Tax-levels, laws, institutions, inflation, unemployment, 
public spending, and many other factors are both directly and indirectly affected by the 
government’s policy. These in turn affect both future cost and future gains for a financial 
investor. Therefore is it reasonable to assume that business actors will pay close attention in 
periods of political transition, and base their investment decision on how they assess potential 
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future revenue. Investors would welcome some changes, for instance removal of a socialist 
regime that have threatened to nationalize and expropriate private assets. However, all 
change brings some level of uncertainty, even in cases where the status quo is an oppressive 
regime. Consequences of new policies are often unknown, even though politicians often 
present them without a doubt and as with no downside. This uncertainty should reflect in 
prices and financial market indicators, it brings risk and should in turn create lower levels of 
investments and higher volatility.  
Institutional factors also affect how fast and how significant the impact of policy change 
becomes. For example, a political system with many checks and balances would cause slower 
and less dramatic policy change. Also, systems where policy decisions are left to independent 
institutions would safe guard for some of the uncertainty brought about by transition. So in 
short, institutional factors can contribute in reducing the uncertainty around change of 
political leadership. Another factor that is seen to calm markets down is a partisan shift to 
more market friendly politics. In general, right-wing incumbents are seen to promote these 
kinds of policies, at least more so than left-wing candidates. Also, developing countries have 
been proven to be more fragile to changes than more developed and robust economies. The 
game theoretical model looks directly at how investment decisions are affected if the political 
status quo is kept or a change occur, trying to isolate this event from other factors that 
possibly can affect financial market output. It highlights the risk with a change in political 
leadership when it comes to future cost and gain for the investors.  
 
3.2 The game-theoretic model14 
Even though game theory is heavily used both in economics and political science, few in the 
previous literature on political change and financial markets have utilized it.15 A game 
theoretical model is a simplification of the real world with the objective of reviling  “the 
underlying dynamics of the situation” (Little 2008). This is especially important given the 
complex nature of the causal link under investigations. First will I go through some basic 
assumptions underlying the model, and after that the model will be presented and discussed.  
The basic assumption, which is almost always present in economics, is that the players 
are rational and always choose the options that maximize their overall utility (Hovi 1998, 4–
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14 The model was first presented in a term-paper at the University of Oslo in the autumn of 2013 (Osa 2013). 15 An exception is Bernhard and Leblang (2006, 50-53), but they used it in the setting of coalition's negations. 
24	   	  
5). The players in this model are investors and voters.16 In real life, they obviously have a 
wide range of possible options but, to simplify, they here face two possible options in each 
round. The investor can invest or not invest in the first round, and in the last round they can 
keep or withdraw their investment. The voter can decide to retain or overthrow the sitting 
incumbent in the second round. The game is then a sequential game with three rounds. I will 
first consider a model with full information, and thereafter a second model where investors 
make their initial investment decision without knowing how the voters view the sitting 
incumbent.  
I assume that the gains from the investment (g) is higher than the risk-free investment 
reward (r) received if they chose not to invest: g > r > 0. There is also a fixed and sunk cost 
by taking the investment (c > 0). However, to keep his investment investors has to pay a 
variable cost (v) that can be either low (L) or high (H). This depends on if the voters keep the 
status quo or changes the political leadership. The idea of a higher variable cost following 
governmental change and subsequent policy changes builds on Rodrik (1991). As already 
mentioned, Rodrik finds that even moderate policy uncertainty can act as a heavy tax on 
investment. A new leadership has the potential to bring about a new framework for the 
investors, by for example changing laws and/or taxes, and, therefore, brings about the 
potential higher variable cost of keeping the investment. Even though, these policies could be 
seen as investor friendly, the effect of these policies are unknown and therefore implies risk. 
The investor also has the options of withdrawing the investment after the voters made their 
choice, leaving them without the gain, but still with the cost of c. Table 3.1 sums up the 
investor`s payoffs under the different scenarios.  
 
Table 3.1: Payoffs investor 
 Keep after election 
(Status quo) 
Keep after election 
(Change) 
Withdraw 
investment 
Invest g-(c+vL) g-(c+vH) -c 
Not-Invest r 
 
In the baseline model, I will assume that the high variable cost is higher than the gain while 
the low cost is lower: vH>g>vL. As I shall highlight later, relaxing this assumption have 
important implications for the game equilibrium.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16 I call the second group voters because I think an election setting is the clearest example of a situation were 
people choose between change or status quo when it comes to political leadership. However, also other 
situations than elections could have the same properties, for example, deciding to join a rebellion to overthrow 
the government.  
	   25	  
The voters can choose between keeping or changing the sitting incumbent. Their payoffs, 
however, depended upon their evaluation of the sitting incumbent, and for simplicity I have 
set these to be either good or bad.17 Not surprisingly, they are most inclined to keep a good 
incumbent and replace the bad one. If they keep the good incumbent they receive 1, and the 
same if they change the bad one. However, the voters also experience uncertainty when a 
change in incumbent occurs. It is uncertainty in regards to future policy and their 
consequences, but also a higher risk of the investors withdrawing their initial investment. 
Jones and Olken (2005) find that changing political leadership potentially could lead to lower 
economic growth. Also, a collective withdrawal of investment might hurt the national 
economy and job security among the inhabitants. Therefore, I will assume that also the voters 
experience some cost by changing the incumbent, even when changing an incumbent that is 
evaluated as bad. This cost is denoted as y, and y > 0. In the case where they choose to keep 
the bad or change the good, I assign the voter a payoff of 0. The voter’s payoffs are 
summarized in table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2: Payoffs voters 
 Status quo Change 
Good incumbent 1 0-y 
Bad Incumbent 0 1-y 
 
What becomes clear is that voters always prefer to keep a good incumbent, as 1 > 0-y by 
assumption. However, if y, the cost of changing the government, is high enough (y > 1) than 
the voters could prefer to keep a bad incumbent. Still, in the baseline model I will assume that 
1 > y and that voters would prefer to change a bad incumbent.  
 
3.2.1 Model 1: Full information 
I firstly evaluated the model under full information. By this assumption there is no 
uncertainty concerning the payoffs or strategies of the player. Both players know this, not 
only about themselves, but also about the other player (Hovi 2008, 31). In addition, they have 
perfect knowledge of the history in the game, implying that they know previous moves by all 
players. Following, the investor knows the state of the incumbent in the eye of the public 
(good or bad) and the voter payoffs, given by table 3.2. The voter also knows the preferences 
and payoffs of the investor, given by table 3.1. It leaves me with two different games: one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  It should be noted that this is in the eye of voters; the investor might prefer the “bad” incumbent. 
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that starts with the prerequisite that the incumbent is good and one where the incumbent is 
bad. These two games are presented in extensive form in figure 3.1 and 3.2.18  
	  
Figure 3.1: Good Incumbent19 	  
In figure 3.1, is the game assuming that the voters view the incumbent as good. At node 
1:1 the investor can decide between invest or not-invest. If he chooses not to invest he 
receives the risk free investment reward (r) and the game stops. In this case, the voters are 
given the payoffs they would most prefer independent of the investors choices in the game. If 
he makes the decision to invest, the voters make the next move in the game. Their choice is 
between maintaining or changing the political status quo. To simplify the presentation, I 
assume that the investors would keep the investment if the status quo were kept. If the 
opposite were true, they would have no incentive to make the initial investment.  
A common way to solve a dynamic game with perfect information is by backward 
induction.20 Therefore, I start at the end with the investor at node 1:2. If g-(c+vH) < -c they 
would choose to withdraw the investment; as they would try and limit there loss, as the 
variable cost gets too high. Since the sunk cost (c) applies on both sides, this can be 
simplified into a question of is the variable cost (vH) bigger than the gain (g).  
 𝑔 − 𝑐 + 𝑣𝐻 < −𝑐 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18 At the end nodes is the investor's payoffs marked with an ”I” and the voters with a ”V”. 19  All the figures related to the game theoretical model is made in the free software Gambit: 
http://gambit.sourceforge.net/ 20 This procedure prescribes to start at the last node in the game (in figure 3.1 and 3.2 that is 1:2) and chose the 
actions that maximize the given players utility. Then, move on to the second to last player and make the action 
that maximizes its utility, knowing what the other players are going to do in the next step. This process 
continues until you are at the start of the game (McCarty and Meirowitz 2007, 175) 
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𝑔 − 𝑣𝐻 < 0 𝑔 < 𝑣𝐻                                                               (3.1) 
 
Equation 3.1 is true by the assumption I made earlier, and the investor would choose to 
withdraw and cut his losses. Then we have to turn to the voters at node 2:1. They chose 
between 1 or 0-y, and obviously 1 > 0-y, given that y > 0. Lastly, the investor at node 1:1 will 
chose to invest if g-(c+vL) > r, which again is true by assumption. The equilibrium solution 
to this game is, therefore, that the investors invest, and the voters keep the status quo by 
keeping/re-electing the good incumbent.  
Now lets look at the situations when the incumbent is rated as bad. The decision at 1:2 
for the investor is the same as above, and he would again choose to withdraw. However, the 
payoffs for the voters at 2:1 has changed: to keep the status quo, 0 > 1-y. I have mentioned 
the possibility that the cost of change is so significant that it would be rational to keep the 
status quo; especially so if they know the investment could be withdrawn. Nonetheless, also 
factors like personal safety, in the case of a repressive regime, or political stability might be 
factors that increase the cost of change. Still, in this baseline model I will assume that the cost 
is low enough and that 0 < 1-y. By this assumption, the voters in the game therefore chose to 
change the bad incumbent in 2:1. This changes the payoffs for the investor at 1:1. He would 
now invest if –c > r. Still, it is clear that a negative cost never can be better than a risk-free 
investment reward, since r > 0. The conclusion of the game with the bad incumbent is 
therefore that the investor chose not to invest in the first round taking the risk-free investment 
and stopping the game.  
	  
Figure 3.2: Bad Incumbent 
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3.2.2 Model 2: Incomplete information 
In the two models above I assumed that the investors knew the voters evaluation of the 
incumbent. However, this assumption will almost never be true in the real world. What is 
more likely is that the investor believes, with some probability, that they know the 
preferences of the electorate. In this next model, I assume a form of incomplete information; 
in that the first move in that game is made by nature, based on chance. This nature move 
gives the probability for if the voters evaluate the incumbent as good or bad. I assign the 
probability of the incumbent being good by p, and the probability of the incumbent being bad 
is therefore given by 1-p.21 The voters, of course, know the true character of the incumbent 
while the investor can only assess this by the given probabilities. However, they still both 
know the payoffs-structure of the game with full information. As shown above in the 
previous models, the investor would prefer to invest if the incumbent is good, and prefer to 
take the risk-free premium if the incumbent is bad. The full game with incomplete 
information is presented in figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3: Full game with incomplete information 	  
Note that, the two nodes denoted 1:1 and 1:2 constitute one information set for the 
investors; they do not know which one they are at or will end up at when making their initial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21 0<p<1 
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investment decision. Given the probability, to invest would give the investor the following 
utility:  
 
            𝑝 𝑔 − 𝑐 + 𝑣𝐿 + (1− 𝑝)(−𝑐)                                            (3.2)     
 
If they chose not to invest they receive the risk free investment (r). This implies that they 
would invest if:22  
 𝑝 >    !!!!!!"                                                                 (3.3) 
 
If equation 3.3 holds up, then the investor would invest in round 1. The game then has a 
separate equilibrium in the investor investing at 1:1. The voters then reveal the true nature of 
the incumbent when they choice to keep the status quo or change the incumbent. The investor 
will still make the same decision in round 3; keep if status quo is played in round 2 and cut 
his losses with withdrawing if a change occurs.  
To contrast this, if the value of p is given by:  
 𝑝 < !!!!!!"                                                                 (3.4) 
 
Then the game has no separate equilibrium and it ends with the investor taking the risk-free 
investment in round 1. 
By examine the right side of equations 3.3 and 3.4; it becomes apparent that the 
investor’s decision is based on the value of the risk-free investment reward and the sunk cost, 
up against future gain and future variable costs. This is a fairly intuitive way of thinking 
about an investment decision, today’s benefits and cost up against future benefits and costs. 
The model identifies the critical point to which the investor no longer would be willing to 
take the risk. Of course, different investors might hold different thresholds of risk, and this 
might lead someone to accept lower levels of p. Then again, since fewer are willing to invest, 
the future return for those willing is potentially higher. This also shows that investors have an 
interest in uncovering the true value of p, or make the best possible estimate of p, in order to 
make investments to fit their risk-profile.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22 The proof for this can be found in the Appendix 1.  
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The value of r and c is probably something the investors know at the beginning of the 
game. However, the denominator values of g and vL are future values not known in advance 
for the investors. In this model I have set the future gain (g) to be fixed, but also future gain 
could be affected by what incumbent is in place. Still, it is easier to think like Rodrik (1991); 
that policy change acts as a tax or cost on investment. Therefore it is the variable cost that 
varies after the elections or power transitions, in this scenario. However, people will be right 
in objecting that also other variables affect the future cost of an investment; as for example 
international, economic and/or market factors. Some of these will be controlled for in the 
statistical analysis. Still, this highlights the complex nature of the inquiry. It also highlights 
the need for a game theoretical interpretation, as it isolates the variables of interest and look 
at possible ways they could affect each other. 
Since the potential for change involves some risk on the future cost of the investment, I 
expect that investors are more careful in these periods, and reduce their investment demand in 
the relevant location. In most cases, market actors know that a change will come, as for 
example most democracies’ elections have to be announced in advance. This means that most 
investors can “play it safe” by waiting until after it is clear who will be in charge. Potentially 
this means that fewer would invest and mean returns would fall; hence, I expect the mean 
value of markets to drop in these periods. 
When it comes to volatility, on the other hand, I would expect that periods of political 
change are associated with higher volatility. The first reason is connected to former assertion, 
lower returns should be followed by a period of higher volatility. As stated by prof. Roger G. 
Ibbotson in a Yale insight (2011) interview: “following a drop in the market, volatility 
typically shoots way up for a time before it dampens down again.”. Secondly, these are 
periods of uncertainty around future policy and therefore are “volatility expected to increase 
as different investors hold different expectation about the future polices of government.” 
(Brunner 2009, 155). Based on this and the literature review, I state my two first hypotheses 
as follows: 
 
H1a: A change in the national political leadership will affect financial 
markets, leading to lower mean values of stock markets 
H1b: A change in the national political leadership will create higher 
volatility in financial markets  
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Even though I assume that all events where power is transferred lead to uncertainty that 
should effect financial markets, it seems clear that changes inside the same party should 
entail less policy uncertainty than a new incumbent from a different party. As the example 
with Brazil - with the elections and re-elections of Lula – illustrates, an ideological change 
with Lula affect markets negatively but no such effect was present in his re-elections. Also, 
when a new incumbent, Dilma Rousseff, from the same party as Lula, took over in 2011 no 
financial down turn was associated with that change (Santiso 2013, 47). Leaders from the 
same party are assumed to pursuit equal policy agendas, and therefore is a change between 
two party colleagues deemed to create less uncertainty around future policy. Based on this I 
make two hypotheses meant to nuance the assumptions made by the two first hypotheses.  
 
H1c: The negative effect of a change in executive leadership on expected 
returns is smaller when the change involves executives from the same party  
H1b: The assumed higher volatility with a change in the executive leadership 
is reduced when the change involves executives from the same party  
 
3.3 Institutions and Partisanship 
Previous attempts to explain how and why political change affects financial markets have 
produced a wide range of different explanatory theories. However, most of them have worked 
around two main topics: (1) Institutions, and (2) partisanship (Bernhard and Leblang 2006, 
5). Institutional theory have found applications in a wide range of disciplines, among them 
sociology, economics and political science (see Lowndes 2010 for review). In regards to the 
question posted here, especially question revolving around constraints on the executive are 
important. When it comes to partisanship, the conventional wisdom is that business actors 
prefer right-wing candidates and therefore will react positively to a change towards the 
political right compared to a change towards the political left. Several hypotheses will be 
based around these two main topics, to give more substance to the analysis and give potential 
explanatory arguments for the assumed relationship in H1.   
 
3.3.1 Institutions 
Institutions set restraints on how much a new leader can change and with what speed. In 
general we can say that a country with many political checks and balance makes it harder for 
the new executive to set new policies quickly into life. It is generally seen to be more checks 
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in a democracy than in an autocracy. However, it is important to note that different 
democratic systems give different forms and number of veto players (Tsebelis 1995). In 
addition, several political systems have given away some power to create stability and less 
uncertainty around leadership changes, as for example the EMU or independent central 
banks. In both of these two examples some authority over monetary policy is left to 
independent institutions that should not be effected by changing political priorities. 
The most precise difference, when it comes to institutions, is between democracies and 
autocracies; I use Gurr (1990, 37–39) distinctions in order to separate these two regime types. 
He defines an autocratic state system as one with strict constraints on political participation, 
with few institutional constraints and only members of the political elites select the top 
incumbent. Democracy, on the hand, he defines as a system where individuals effectively can 
express their view on policy and political leadership, while civil liberties are guaranteed and 
institutional constraints exist to limit a leaders power to do as they please.  
As noted earlier, democracies and the institutions connected to this form of government; 
as property rights, openness, constraints on the executive and respect for the rule of law, are 
seen to be associated with higher financial development (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; 
Haber, North, and Weingast 2008). Still, Yang (2011), conducting one of the few empirical 
studies on this, finds no connection between democracy and stock market development. 
However, Ghardallou and Boudriga (2012) find that in the short-run democracies effect on 
financial development is mixed, but in the long-run democracy has a positive effect on all 
financial development measures. They claim this connection mainly comes down to the fact 
that democracy “dilutes the degree of elite control over economic resources.” (Ghardallou 
and Boudriga 2012, 25). However, it is still widely debated whether democracy has a positive 
effect on economic growth (Knutsen 2012).  
Most research on political change and financial markets has focused on democratic 
elections and therefore ignored power transitions in autocracies. This has one natural 
explanation in that business data have been difficult to obtain for non-democratic countries, 
and this gives few data points to make estimations on. This is also true for this inquiry, 
democracies are overrepresented, but by not focusing on elections has the event of change I 
can include those autocratic countries that have available financial data. By assumption, I 
believe that fewer veto players and more centralized power would scare financial markets 
more as policies and regulations could be changed faster and with fewer obstacles. It makes 
the political framework more delicate and riskier, factors that should make the financial 
markets respond more volatile to change in autocratic regimes. The results from Jones and 
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Olken (2005) show that the death of an autocrat significantly affects economic growth levels, 
and that when these types of power transfers are added to the model there is no significant 
effect from political change in democracies.   
To connect this to the game model above, I look into some of the reasons why 
democracy should produce higher and more stable financial development. First of all, the 
open political processes in a democracy should bring more legitimacy to the processes and 
create less reason for violence and protest against the change. It should also bring investors a 
clear picture of the future cost by exposing the policy that the opposition will pursuit in the 
case they win the elections. Elections in democracies have to be called, some countries 
follow strict electoral periods holding elections every 4 or 5 year, while other allow elections 
to be held also inside electoral periods. This should make the change more predictable, and as 
noted earlier, Bernhard and Leblang (2006) have shown that anticipated power transfers 
reduce the volatility compared to more sudden and unpredictable changes. Since democracies 
also are associated with openness, this should imply that it is easier for investors to know if 
the voters view the sitting incumbent as good or bad – giving them a clearer idea of the value 
of p – and therefore less uncertainty in the initial investment decision.  
 
H2a: Leader changes in autocratic regimes reduces the expected return more 
than in democracies 
H2b: Leader changes in democratic regimes create less volatile financial 
market then leader change in autocracies.   
 
Institutions that isolated economic policy decision from changing politicians should 
favor stability and create less volatility in financial markets. Maxfield (1997, 5) describe the 
role of an independent central bank as: “[A] guard against financial instability”. However, the 
effects of central bank independence on economic parameters have been tested in different 
studies (within economics), but still no consensus has been reached in the literature 
(Bernhard and Leblang 2006, 5).  
I argue that an independent central bank has the possibility to reduce the potentially high 
variable cost (vH) of a political change. The reason is that a political change would not affect 
monetary policy, as that is under control of an independent institution. Changes in monetary 
policy are one of the policy changes that could cause high cost for an investment done under 
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other premises. I will assume that an independent central bank would safeguard against some 
of the negative effect of change in the incumbent.  
 
H2c: Having an independent central bank will create less uncertainty and 
less negative mean returns in periods of political leadership change 
H2d: Independent central banks should lead to less volatility in markets 
through periods of leadership change 
 
Also, the electoral system has the potential to affect financial markets reactions to 
political change. Bittlingmayer (1998) finds that stock market volatility was lower under 
imperial Germany, compared to the Weimar-era. A reason for this comes from the fact that 
Weimar Germany had a proportional electoral system with no threshold for representation, 
which created a fragmented political landscape (Osa 2012b, 5).23 Today democracies can be 
divided among many scales; proportional vs. plurality electoral systems, or presidential vs. 
parliamentary systems, and many which lays somewhere in-between. One line of arguments 
is that, differences between electoral systems in democracies might create different forms of 
uncertainty for financial actors. For example Vuchelen (2003) argues that single party 
government are associated with less financial risk than coalition government, just because 
policies are easier to predict. Also, in plurality systems, it is clear shortly after the elections 
who won, while more proportional systems might create more uncertainty in periods of 
cabinet formation (Bernhard and Leblang 2006; Brunner 2009; Leblang and Bernhard 2006). 
As some political systems have two clear-cut candidates, as the US, which create few 
potential policy options. Proportional systems might bring coalition government with more 
inconsistent policy alternatives.  
However, it is also possible to make the opposite argument: Since the compositions of 
parliament change less abruptly in proportional systems, policy also last longer. If a policy 
change occurs, it often leads to revision instead of reversal. In a plurality system, a new 
regime has much more freedom to make sudden policy changes or reversals (Rogowski 
1987). Rodrik (1991) argues that changes or reversal of policy creates instability and makes 
investment less productive. Hence “[p]olicy reversals become even more problematic when 
foresighted investors, in anticipation, withhold investments altogether.” (Knutsen 2011b, 85).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23 No less than twenty different parties were represented in coalition governments in the Weimar-era, 1918-
1933 (Osa 2012b, 5). 
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To relate this to the model, more predictable policy would make it easier to predict the 
values of the denominator in 3.3. As a consequence, these investments could be adjusted, and 
I would assume prices to be less effected by a change in the incumbent. The game model 
above, in some sense, better reflects a plurality system than a proportional electoral system, 
as the result is either change or status quo. Proportional systems can create situations “in-
between” the two, with for example new parties represented in a coalitions government. This 
is assumed to reduce some the high variable cost with a change in political leadership. Also, 
since the event I focus on is the time when the new incumbent takes office, the uncertainty 
around coalitions building in proportional system is gone. In sum, I state that a proportional 
system creates the most stability through periods of change since change in policy is less 
abrupt.  
 
H2e: Plurality system creates lower returns in periods of leadership change  
H2f: Proportional electoral system creates less volatility in periods of 
leadership change  
 
3.3.2 Partisanship 
The case presented in section 2.3.1 about Lula and Brazil, highlights one of the recurring 
debates of the literature; namely on how markets respond to change in the partisanship or 
ideology of the government. Partisan politics, and how it influences economic growth and 
financial market stability, has been in focus for several studies in the of field International 
Political Economy (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Franzese 2002; Füss and Lenz 2011; 
Leblang and Mukherjee 2005). The general idea is that financial actors, to a greater extend, 
prefer right-wing candidates that follow market-friendly policies. As right-wing candidates in 
general are seen to care more about keeping inflation down (which benefits capital owners), 
left-wing candidates are in general more dedicated to holding down unemployment (Hibbs 
1977). 24 Campello (2002) finds empirical evidence that support this. However, the picture is 
not always as clear. Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003), for instance, find that returns in the 
stock market was higher under Democratic presidents than under Republican in the US. Also, 
stock markets tend to rally when left-wing parties take government; investors change their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24 This relates to the Phillips curve in economics, which predicts a trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment.  
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portfolio towards stocks to hedge against the inflationary consequences of leftist-policies 
(Bernhard and Leblang 2006, 6).  
How partisanship effects volatility has also be discussed in the previous literature. One 
camp argues that trading volumes should increase under right-wing incumbent, or the 
prospect of one, and that therefore the volatility would increase under this types of executives 
(Brunner 2009; Leblang and Mukherjee 2005). The other camp argues that the “right-wing 
focus” on holding down inflations would create more stable financial markets, and therefore 
less volatility in the case of a right-wing incumbent taking over (Freeman, Hays, and Stix 
2000; Herron 2000). Interestingly enough, all of them agree that mean returns should be 
higher under right-wing executives.  
Left-wing parties are associated with less market friendly policy, afflicting higher taxes 
and strict laws on business, while right-wing policies often sets out to reduce these costs. 
Therefore, change to the political left should increase the variable cost for the investors, and 
maybe also reduce the potential gain. Prices on financial assets should reflect this with lower 
returns. When it comes to volatility, I still assume that a change to the political left includes 
more uncertainty around future policy for investors, and therefore would lead to higher 
volatility. Even though, change to a right-wing executive might reduce some of these factors, 
I will still assume that changes in policy always induce uncertainty and therefore a cost on 
investments.  
 
H3a: Incumbent changes to the political left have stronger negative effects 
on financial market value than changes to the political right.  
H3b: Volatility is higher under left-wing executives, than under right-wing 
incumbents   
 
3.4 Developing economies 
In the previous literature, much focus has been on developing countries, possibly because the 
market responses to political events are clearer and less ambiguous in these countries (Frot 
and Santiso 2013, 27). The effects are, however, not only likely present in emerging markets, 
as I already have argued. Campello (2007) argues that investors should react in much the 
same way in developed countries.  However, the general political risk is seen to be higher in 
developing countries; as the economic data is less reliable and politics is less transparent 
(Brooks and Mosely 2008). Financial turbulence and politics have been closely linked in 
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emerging markets. One explanation for this is the weak government hypotheses, which states 
that “weak governments delay the implementation of necessary, but political costly economic 
reform” (Martínez and Santiso 2003, 364). This evidence suggests that emerging markets be 
more exposed to political uncertainty than more established economies. For instance, Mexico 
had major financial collapses linked with the elections in 1976, 1982, and 1994 (Santiso 
1999). However, as pointed out by Santiso (2013, xix), the paradox is that this happened 
during an autocratic period, and that newer democratic elections have not caused the same 
level of nervousness among investors. 
Market actors also could be more on alert to abnormal political events in emerging 
markets. For example, Collier (2003) shows that civil wars happen more frequently in low- 
and middle-income countries. Also, political crises of different sort and severity happen more 
regularly in developing, compared to developed countries. As an illustration, Blanco and 
Grier (2009, 76) identifies in Latin-America between 1970-2000, “50 political assassinations, 
20 coups, more than 140 guerrilla wars and revolutions, and 113 crises that threatened to 
bring down sitting governments.”. Many of these event, lead to leader change or is a result of 
change in the sitting government. This should add to the uncertainty around a new 
incumbent.25 
Developing countries are generally associated with higher political risk, and weaker 
governments. I will expect that the effects of political change on financial markets are higher 
than in more developed markets. Both these factors give less certainty around future cost and 
gain for the investor. Since abnormal event have much higher chance of occurring, it would 
also make it harder for the investor to uncover the true value of p, making the change less 
predictable.  
  
H4a: Developed countries experience lower returns in periods of leadership 
change, than more developed economies 
H4b: Developed countries experience lower levels of volatility than emerging 
economies   
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25 However, it should be noted that the increased uncertainty around a new incumbent could also cause these 
events. 
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3.5 Summary of the hypotheses.  
These four groups of hypotheses will be tested in the analysis to give more substantive 
answers to the research question: How does change in political leadership affect financial 
markets? I expect changes in the political leadership to give lower returns and higher 
volatility in national stock markets, even more so when also the ruling party is changed as 
well as the incumbent. However, some institutional variables might calm this effect, like 
democracy, a proportional electoral system, and having an independent central bank. 
Additionally, are right-wing incumbents, with market-friendly policy, also regarded as 
something that would relax the negative effects of change in the political leadership. Lastly, 
the previous literature has identified a stronger link between policy uncertainty and financial 
turmoil in developing countries, and I would assume that the effects from the two first 
hypotheses are stronger in this group of countries. The next chapter will explain the data and 
methods used in the empirical analysis.  
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4 Research design 	  
This chapter describes the research design for the thesis and the data used in the analysis. 
Following Koulakiotis, Dasilas and Tolikas (2008), I use two different statistical techniques 
to test different aspects of how political change can affect financial markets. The first is a 
standard event study model, which is based on calculating the abnormal returns in periods of 
political transitions. The other is a GARCH-model, which is a common model-specification 
in finance. The latter will be used to look at the volatility in markets during these same 
periods. The substantive reason for using both of these model specifications is that they 
highlight two different and important aspects – average change in return and the volatility - of 
what kind of effects we can expect from markets in time of political change.  
The event study analysis builds an intuitive model in looking for how returns in stock 
markets are affected by political change. The general idea behind this model is to try and 
calculate how markets would have preformed had the leadership change not occurred, and 
then compare this to the actual returns during the periods of leadership change. This allows 
me to investigate if abnormal returns are present in periods of political change. The GARCH-
model is a way to model the variance in the financial markets. By looking at how these 
change in periods of the political change, I can evaluate how much returns vary in these 
periods. The models will thus expand on each other’s findings. Before I describe the models 
in more detail, I briefly introduce the data used in the analysis. I also provide necessary 
background for understanding the models and results by giving a short introduction to 
theories behind how prices are set in financial markets.  
 
4.1 Data 
Stock market data is used for constructing the dependent variable in the analysis. As became 
apparent from the literature review, many proxies for measuring financial markets 
performance have been used in previous research. However, I would argue that stock market 
indexes are the best fit as the dependent variable in this thesis. There are several important 
reasons for this. First of all, these indexes comprise measure of the overall state of a given 
country’s stock markets. They are computed as some weighted average of individual stocks, 
and can, for example, be based on the top 50 companies in the market (see Valdes and 
Molyneux 2013, 206-209 for detailed examples). Therefore, they represent a broad and 
representative specter of the value of financial entities. 
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A stock market index reflects the future value of investments in that given country. To 
put it simply, a financial asset is a bet on the future value of that entity (ref. section 2.2). The 
price of a share is the sum of its expected dividends divided by the value of the risk-free 
investment (r) (Jensen and Schmith 2005, 1254–1255). 
 𝑃 = Σ(Expected  dividends)/r                                            (4.1) 
 
Since stock markets reflect these prices on a aggregated level, and therefore also the prospect 
of future prices, they should be “a good proxy for investors’ appraisal for future 
governments’ policies.” (Campello 2007, 11). This is similar to the conclusions of the game 
theoretical model presented earlier, and equation 3.3, where future gain and cost have to be 
evaluated against the risk-free investment reward (r). In additions to these substantive 
reasons, it is also a fact that stock market indexes are freely available for fairly long time-
series and over a wide variety of countries; at least compared to other financial proxies like 
bonds.  
The data on national stock markets are taken from Thomson Reuters Datastream, and is 
measured in average monthly value on the main nation stock market index.26 Some earlier 
studies have utilized annual data (Brooks and Mosely 2008; Mosley and Singer 2008), but 
like Frot and Santiso (2013, 31) point out: “Given that investors quickly update their 
expectations, we consider it to be a substantial advantage to have access to monthly data.”. 
The data starts in 1970m1 and goes until 2004m12. The limitation to stop in 2004 is given by 
the Archigos-dataset on leaders that is used in this thesis. I also utilize data on global and 
regional stock market index in the analysis. These are taken from MSCI.27 I tried to use 
regional index as far as possible, but some markets are better suited to be view up against a 
global benchmark. One of the reasons for having indices is to have benchmarks for the rest of 
the market, and these global indexes are used as benchmark for the individual countries 
markets. For instance, to see how a country like a Brazil has evolved in regards to other 
comparable economies. This taps in to the idea of relative efficiency, that markets are 
efficient in comparison to other comparable markets. However, to build a more realistic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26 While several countries have multiple stock market indexes, I have used the ones Datastream identifies as the 
main market index for the given country.  27 The data is available on their website: http://www.msci.com/  
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yardstick, I also include two important international commodity prices: the change in price of 
gold and the change of the prices of oil.28 29 Both of these are measured in US dollars. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the 48 countries included in the analysis. The table also includes 
the name of the national index and regional index used for each individual country. Note that 
not all time-series are complete all the way from 1970, so the analysis is based on an 
unbalanced panel data set. The start of each time series is indicated in parentheses after the 
county in the table bellow.  
 
Table 4.1: Countries and stock markets in the analysis 
Country National Stock market Index Regional/global index 
Argentina (1989m11) Mercado de Valores de Buenos Aires MERVAL EM Latin America 
Australia (1972m2) All Ordinaries Index World ex Australia 
Bangladesh (1990m1) Bangladesh all Share Price Index  FM (Frontier markets) 
Belgium (1979m12) Brussels Stock Exchange Stock Market Price Index Europe 
Brazil (1993m3) Brasil Sao Paulo Stock Exchange Index (Bovespa) EM Latin America ex 
Brazil 
Canada (1970m1) Toronto Stock Exhange composite Share Price Index World ex Canada 
Chile (1993m9) Santiago Stock Exchange Ipsa Index (IPSA) EM Latin America 
China (1997m1) Shanghai SE Composite Index EM Asia 
Colombia (1985m12) Colombian Stock Price Index EM Latin America 
Croatia (1997m1) The Zagreb Stock Exchange equity index 
(CROBEX) 
EM Eastern Europe 
Czech Republic 
(1993m9) 
PX Index EM Eastern Europe 
Denmark (1970m1) Copenhagen Stock Exchange general Share Price 
Index 
Nordic Countries 
Finland (1970m1) Helsinki Stock Exhange All Share Price Index Nordic Countries 
France (1970m1) Société des Bourses Françaises 250 Index (SBF250) Europe 
Greece (1985m1) FTSE/Athex Large Cap EM Europe 
Hungary (1991m1) BUX Index EM Eastern Europe 
Iceland (1992m12) ICEX All Share Price Index Europe 
India (1987m1) S&P Bombay Stock Exchange Sensitive Index EM Asia 
Indonesia (1989m12) Jakarta Stock Exchange Composite EM Asia 
Ireland (1970m1) ISEQ 20 Europe 
Israel (1992m4) Tel Aviv 100 World ex Israel 
Italy (1970m1) Milan Comit General Share Price Index Europe 
Japan (1970m1) Nikkei 225 World ex Japan 
Kenya (1990m1) Nairobi S.E. Index FM Africa 
Lithuania (1999m12) NASDAQ OMX Vilnius EM Eastern Europe 
Malaysia (1980m1) Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) EM Asia 
Mexico (1981m1) Índice de Precios y Cotizaciones (IPC) EM Latin America 
Morocco (1987m12) CFG 25 Index FM Africa 
Netherland (1970m1) AEX index Europe 
New Zealand (1986m6) NZX 50 Index World 
Norway (1995m12) Oslo Stock Exhange Benchmark Index Nordic Countries 
Poland (1991m4) Warsaw General Share Price Index EM Easter Europe 
Portugal (1988m1) PSI General Stock Price Index Europe 
Romania (1998m4) RM BSE Market Composite (BET-C) Index EM Eastern Europe 
Russia (1994m9) Moscow Share Price Index EM Eastern Europe 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28 Gold prices in USD, downloaded from: http://www.quandl.com/BUNDESBANK/BBK01_WT5511 29 Crude oil prices adjusted for inflation using the headline CPI. Downloaded from: 
http://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart  
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Slovenia (1993m8) SBI 20 EM Eastern Europe 
South Africa (1973m1) FTSE/JSE All-Share FM Africa 
South Korea (1974m12) Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) EM Asia 
Spain (1970m1) Madrid S.E. – General Index Europe 
Sri Lanka (1985m1) Colombo All Share Price Index EM Asia 
Sweden (1980m1) Stockholm Stock Exhange Affarsvarlden Index Nordic Countries 
Switzerland (1987m9) Swiss Performance Index (SPI) Europe 
Taiwan (1970m1) Taiwan Capitalization Weighted Stock Index  
(TAIEX) 
EM Asia 
Thailand (1975m4) Bangkok Stock Exchange Price Index EM Asia 
Turkey (1988m1) ISE-100 Index  EM Europe 
United Kingdom 
(1970m1) 
FT All Share Index Europe 
United State of America 
(1970m1) 
Dow Jones Industrial Average Share Price Index World ex. US 
Note: Abbreviations: EM= Emerging Markets; FM= Frontier Markets.; Ex= Except   
 
As is common in financial data time-series, I recode the stock market data into monthly 
return data (Rt) defined as the difference in index value on consecutive months (Brunner 
2009, 157). This is done both to the national stock market index and the global/regions 
indexes. These values are expressed in percentage terms given by:  
 𝑅! = 100 ∗ !!!!!!!!!!!                                                       (4.2) 
 
The other main source of data, on political leaders, is from the Archigos-dataset.30 
Archigos identifies the de facto incumbent for the world’s countries between 1875 and 2004. 
In most cases it is not controversial who is coded as leader, but some special and disputable 
cases are apparent. For example, many countries have multiple heads of state (see Goemans, 
Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009). To make two broad generalizations, in parliamentary systems 
the prime minister is coded as leader, and in presidential systems the president is coded as the 
incumbent (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009, 272). Archigos also contains data on 
how the incumbent entered and left office.  
To test my other hypotheses and to control for omitted variables bias, other sources of 
data were needed. Since Archigos only give data on when the incumbent is changed, and not 
which of these entailed a party change as well, this information had to be taken from 
somewhere else. However, this obviously provides some challenges since coding of who is 
the incumbent and party definitions might vary. My party change data is taken from NELDA 
(Hyde and Marinov 2012), and I controlled that the 79 identified party changes in the dataset 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30 The Archigos-data is downloaded from: http://www.rochester.edu/college/faculty/hgoemans/data.htm  
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are in fact just that.31 A party change does most likely contain a higher chance for policy 
shifts or reversals bring more uncertainty in future cost and gains.  
To check how institutional variables affect the results, several sources of data were used. 
The data on democracy is from the Polity IV Project.32 Based on this I constructed a dummy 
variable for democracy on the threshold of at least 6 on the polity-scale (Mansfield, Milner, 
and Rosendorff 2000). Data on electoral systems were taken from the Database on Political 
Institutions (DPI) (Beck et al. 2001).33 It is used to check if a financial market response is 
dependent on the electoral system in place. The two variables used are dummies, coded “1” if 
the given system is in place. These two are plurality and proportional (PR) electoral system. 
They are defined in the datasets codebook as followed:  
 
In plurality systems, legislators are elected using a winner-take-all/first past the post 
rule. 1 if this system is used, 0 if it isn’t…[PR:]1 if candidates are elected based on 
the percent of votes received by their party and/or if our sources specifically call the 
system proportional representation; 0 otherwise (Keefer 2012, 16) 
 
The last institutional variable is central bank independence, meaning that an independent 
institution has command of the nations monetary policy. Data on central bank independence 
are from The Intuitions and Elections Project at Binghamton University.34 As institutions are 
the “rules” both business and political actors have to deal with, they are potentially important 
explanatory reason for differences in market reaction to political change.  
I also want to test if partisanship effect how markets respond. The conventional wisdom 
is that business actors prefer right-wing candidates. DPI includes a variable on the party 
orientation of the incumbent, based on economic policy coded from the World Bank 
classification. In the data, three possible positions exist with one last category for cases where 
no such information is possible to deduct: (1) Right, (2) center, (3) Left, and (4) no 
information (Keefer 2012, 6). Since I am mostly concerned about the difference between left 
and right, I construct two dummy variables one for each of these extreme positions. In 
additions, for the event study analysis I made a dummy variable identifying changes to the 
left and changes to the right.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31 The NELDA-data is downloaded from: http://hyde.research.yale.edu/nelda/  32 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm  33 Available at: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20649465~page
PK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html  34 Available at: http://www2.binghamton.edu/political-science/institutions-and-elections-project.html  
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The last hypotheses from the theoretical section was in relation to if the country could be 
seen as developing or developed. Much of the previous literature have focused on this issue, 
mainly because developing and emerging market have been seen to be especially fragile to 
political uncertainty (Santiso 2013, xxiv). The coding on this dived is done by the author, 
based on the countries IMF define as developing (IMF 2012).  
Most of these variables are measured on an annual base, and they where given the same 
value for each month in that year. Since institutional variables change slowly, this is not seen 
to be a major shortcoming for the analysis. However, the partisanship variable needed some 
manual adjustments, and where modified to change in the month the new leader took office. 
This change was applied manually in the dataset by the author.35  
Since the country in my analysis is not randomly drawn from a sample, but rather the 
whole populations of countries with available financial statistics, I am generalizing within 
stochastic model theory rather than within sample theory. With sample theory, when 
examining the whole population, one ought to get perfect predictions and therefore it would 
be no need for significance tests. Still, when using the rational of stochastic model theory, 
generalizing is from observations to the process or mechanism that brings about the present 
data (Gold 1969, 44; Henkel 1976, 85f; Osa 2012b, 18).36 
 
4.2 A short introduction to assets price forecasting 
To present the empirical regression equations for the analysis, I first have to clarify basic 
models in predicting future prices of assets. As already noted, the prices of shares are decided 
by the expected future dividends of that entity. I still assume, as is common in finance, that 
all actors are rational and that they seek to maximize their gains from their investments.37 It 
has have over the years been presented many models and theories explaining how and why 
prices vary. However, two have attracted particular attention, both in the world of finance and 
academia. The first is the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). It presents one of the basic 
ways of thinking about how assets are priced in the market, and is the intellectual background 
for many current practices in the finance industry (Sharpe, Alexander, and Bailey 1995).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35 The complete dataset and do-file from Stata is handed in on a memory stick to the Institute of political 
science at the University of Oslo (UiO) together with the thesis on the 23th May 2014, one copy in accordance 
with UiO rules. The data is also available upon request: pederbos@student.sv.uio.no    36 Any lack of statistical significance would imply that the co-variation formed by nature is no more probable 
than that produced by chance (Gold 1969, 44) 37 Yet, a growing literature in finance is arguing that investors deviate from purely rational behavior (see e.g. 
Barberis and Thaler 2003).  
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Basically it states that the only thing that separates the futures price of different assets is their 
different risk profiles. So an asset that is risky could potentially lead to bigger profits (or 
losses) than less risky assets. To formalize this argument:  
 𝑟! = 𝑟! + 𝛽! 𝑟! − 𝑟!                                             (4.3) 
 
The rf  is the rate of a risk free investment; the same as r in the game theoretical model. 𝑟! is 
the expected market return for the period, and when we subtract the risk-free investment you 
get the equity market premium. This tells you the extra profit the investor expect in return for 
the risk taken. The beta coefficient is the key to understand how risky an asset is, if 𝛽!=1 
then the only variance is the difference between the expected market return and the risk free 
investment (Sharpe, Alexander, and Bailey 1995, 276). Under this model there is little rom to 
expect measurable effects from political events (Brunner 2009, 154).  
The expected market return is often based on a comparable asset in the economy. 
However, the model is very sensitive to what kind of benchmark is chosen (Bernhard and 
Leblang 2006, 61). Another criticism comes from Roll (1977, 129–130) noting that CAPM 
requires an exact identification of all possible investable options to be useful, and that no test 
is available to give us clear and unambiguous answer to that identification process.    
Brunner (2009), in his study of elections effects on stock markets in the Netherlands, as 
well as Bernhard and Leblang (2006), suggest using another model: the arbitrage pricing 
theory (APT). This theory has more flexible assumptions about the social world; several 
factors can explain the movement in prices other than risk. Under the assumption of APT, it 
is not only the difference between the risk-free investment and expected market return that 
give an asset future value, but also some sort of non-diversifiable risk; risk that is common to 
all assets in the model.  
 𝑟! = 𝑟! + 𝛽! 𝑓! + 𝛽! 𝑓! …+ 𝛽! 𝑓!                                                                                             (4.4) 
 
The APT uses a beta for every factor that could affect the price of the asset. Examples of 
factors that could be placed into the model are increases in oil prices or international conflicts 
(Schneider and Troeger 2006). Still, also more general political uncertainty created by more 
predictable events, like elections, could be a factor in the model (Brunner 2009). With the 
APT as theoretical background it is much easier to see that the uncertainty brought about with 
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a change in political leadership could affect financial markets. The major challenge and issue 
in working with the APT is the identifications of the factors that should be represented in the 
model (Bernhard and Leblang 2006, 63).  
I use the APT as a starting point for my main regression equations. The regional/global 
index, which is different for every country is the first factor in the model. Also, I include two 
factors, which are the same across all countries indexes, the change in price of gold and the 
change in the prices of oil. These are two important commodity prices that are seen to affect 
all markets. This model is based on Barnhard and Leblang (2006) and Forbes and Chinn 
(2004).38 The generic form of my APT is given by: 
 𝑅!"! =   𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑅𝑊!! + 𝛽!∆𝐺𝑜𝑙𝑑! + 𝛽!∆𝑂𝑖𝑙! + 𝜀!                          (4.5) 
 
 𝑅!"!  is the return of the national stock market index, and that is given by a benchmark index 
(𝑅𝑊!!), the change in gold prices and the change in the price of oil. In addition there is a 
random error (𝜀!); the rate of return not predicted by the factors. In table 4.2 bellow, are these 
four variables summarized: 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38 In contrast to Bernhard and Leblang (2006), I include the US in the analysis and the benchmark index is 
therefore a regional or global index from MSCI instead of the US stock market. In addition, is the industrial 
sector index not used due to data availability.  
Table 4.2: Summary statistics for main economic variables 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Monthly 
return data 
 
13685 1.236 7.821 -42.463 105.932 
Return 
MSCI-index 
 
13685 0.781 5.058 -35.379 27.309 
Change in 
international 
gold-prices 
 
13685 0.716 17.159 -111.74 220.23 
Change in 
international 
oil-prices 
13685 0.073 3.043 -15.44 28.03 
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4.3 Event study 
Event studies have been used in both political science and economics, and the method has 
been widely used in finance to look at how events, such as announcements (Agrawal and 
Kamakura 1995), shifts in laws (Bhagat and Romano 2002), or unexpected news (Yermack 
1997), affect firms’ stock return. In political science the method has found a broad rang of 
applications, especially connected to elections and conflicts (see Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones 2004 for an overview). It has also been used in previous studies on how political events 
affect financial markets (Bernhard and Leblang 2006; Campello 2007). The intuition behind 
the model is to test how markets would have preformed if the changes haven’t occurred. This 
is done by estimating normal returns, and then compared them to the actual returns in periods 
of political change; the difference is then defined as the abnormal returns (Campbell, Lo, and 
MacKinlay 1997, 151).  
An event study stipulates the need to define an event window, and a window of 
estimation (illustrated in figure 4.1). “The idea is to compare the performance of an asset 
during a period of relative stability prior to the event (estimation window) to a period after 
the event (the event window).” (Bernhard and Leblang 2006, 73). For statistical purposes, the 
estimation window need to be at least 8 times as long as the event window. Campello (2007), 
which also uses monthly data, suggest using an estimation window of 24 months before the 
event to estimate normal performance of stock markets. The event window is set for 3 
months, start one-month prior and end one month after the leadership change. This event 
window is chosen to capture the expectations before the change and capture some of slow 
reactions when policy is presented and put out in actions. Still, an event study model could be 
highly sensitive to the specifications of the event window, and different time period lengths 
are tested to check the robustness of the results. The robustness-tests, which are presented 
after the analysis, confirm that the results are sensitive to change in the length of the event 
window. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Illustration of event study analysis.  
Estimation	  window	  24	  months	  	   Event	  window	  3	  months	  	   Time	  	  New	  leader	  takes	  office	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As a statistical model we use equations 4.5 to predict market returns. The estimated 
returns are predicted from the estimation window for all events where in the incumbent is 
changed in the dataset, and the residuals (𝜀!), or abnormal returns, are then generated for the 
event window. This implies that abnormal returns are generated in the event period for each 
panel in the dataset by:  
 𝜀!"∗ = 𝑅!" − 𝐸 𝑅!"   𝑋!)                                                    (4.6) 
 𝑅!" is the actual rate of return for the stock market index, while 𝐸(𝑅!") is the normal returns. 𝑋! is then the conditioning information for the normal performance model. This term can be 
given as a constant; the model is then called the constant-mean-return-model. Here, however, 
does a market model, defined by equations 4.5, give the conditioning information. How 
beneficial the market model is relative to the constant-mean-return-model depends on the 
value of R2 for each panel. “The higher the R2 the greater is the variance reduction of the 
abnormal return, and the larger is the gain.” (MacKinlay 1997, 18). To summarize, the 
difference between the actual observed returns (𝑅!") and the expected returns (𝐸 𝑅!"   𝑋!)), 
based on the previous 24 months, is the abnormal returns.  
To get an aggregated variable across all the panels is it common to calculate cumulative 
abnormal returns, which is the sum of all the abnormal returns inside each event window. 
Bernhard and Leblang (2006), also suggest looking at average abnormal returns. I will 
calculate both of these and used them as a starting point to see if abnormal returns exist in 
periods of political change, and which explanatory variables can explain these abnormalities.  
   
4.4 GARCH-model 
In additions to the mean effects on the stock markets, I also want to investigate the effect on 
the variance of the markets stemming from periods of political change. To conduct such 
analysis of variance, it is common to use a GARCH-specification (see e.g. Alberg, Shalit, and 
Yosef 2008; Brunner 2009; Leblang and Bernhard 2006; Leblang and Mukherjee 2004; Lobo 
and Tufte 1998). GARCH, or general autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity, is a 
model for time-series where volatility is clustered together (heteroskedasticity); which is 
often the case with financial data. The autoregressive term tells us that the model takes into 
account past values on the time-series (Brunner 2009, 160). Heteroskedasticity means that we 
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have data with non-constant variance, which by running a standard OLS would present 
standard errors and confidence intervals that are too narrow (Skog 2010, 236-237). GARCH-
models on the other hand, treat heteroskedasticity as a variance to be modeled inside the 
regression (Engle 2001, 157).  
In financial data, large returns (positive or negative) tend to be followed by large returns 
(Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 1997, 481–482). We can see this in the two time-series 
bellow from the US and Finish stock market. While the individual months vary widely, they 
do so within a range that changes slowly. This means that financial data often shows little 
sign of autocorrelations, since the variation from month to month seems random, but the 
visual fact shows that the volatility clusters together. Looking at the figure at the left, it 
shows a time-series of monthly return for Finland. It is clear that the earlier periods, pre 1990, 
show lower levels of volatility than the latter periods. The figure to the right shows the same 
for the US stock market. First observation is that the US has had less volatile markets in this 
period, compared to Finland. However, still it shows that a high positive return is often 
followed by a high negative value, or vice versa. On the other side are small movements in 
returns most likely followed by a new period of small variance. Also, it is possible to see that 
volatility clusters, for example the period after year 2000 in the US, compared to the period 
1990-2000.39  
 
  
Figure 4.2: Monthly returns for Finland and USA. 1970-2004 
 
Also, financial time-series often shows signs of “fat-tails” in the distributions. Some 
values are very far away from the average, breaking with the normal distribution assumed in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39 The GARCH-model propose a statically construction to deal with the fact of volatility clustering, however, 
economic explanations on why it happens is still debated; for a review see Cont (2007) 
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an OLS-regression.40 It is possible to see this distribution in the histogram of the dependent 
variable, change in stock market index values, and is confirmed through a high value of 
kurtosis in the distributions: 17.656. A normal distribution has a kurtosis value at 3, and fat 
tailed distributions have higher values of kurtosis (Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 1997, 16). 
The GARCH-process deals with some of this excessive kurtosis in the data. “Therefore, when 
we use GARCH models, we can model both the conditional heteroskedasticity and the heavy-
tailed distributions of Financial markets data.” (Ruppert 2010, 484) 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Histogram dependent variable 
 
In contrast to the inter-disciplinary use of event models, GARCH-models have been 
manly used by the academic discipline of economics; and more specifically the study of 
finance. However, Lebo and Box-Steffensmeier (2008) argue that these specifications also 
can be useful in the study of research questions common to political science. In econometrics, 
GARCH-models have been so widely used that it has been called “the great workhorse of 
applied econometrics” (Engle 2001, 157).  
The GARCH specifications calculated the mean and variance of the returns based on the 
past information. “While many specifications have been considered for the mean return and 
have been used in efforts to forecast future returns, virtually no methods were available for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40 The problem surrounding these kinds of extreme outliers in the distributions where popularized by Taleb 
(2010), in his book The Black Swan. 
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the variance before the introduction of ARCH models.” (Engle 2001, 159). The ARCH-
model was the forerunner to the GARCH specifications, and the first model to seriously 
measure variance in econometrics. Before this, volatility was measured using rolling standard 
deviations over x time periods. However, the problem with this approach is that each time 
period receives equal weight in the estimation of the current period’s variance. The Arch 
process, proposed by Engle (1982), solves this by letting these weights be parameters to be 
estimated. This allows the data to determined the best weight to be used on the present 
volatility (Engle 2001). A formalized ARCH-model can be seen here:   
 𝜎!! = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝑎!!!!                                                    (4.7) 
 𝜎!! is the squared conditional variance in the model. So the conditional variance is here 
described as a distributed lag of past squared innovation (Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 
1997, 483). That means that the variance of the current error term is a function of the size of 
the previous period’s squared error term. In order to avoid a very large number of coefficient 
in high order polynomial, Bollerslev (1986) developed the GARCH-model as a 
generalization of Engle’s (1982) ARCH-model. This makes a declining weight that never 
reaches zero (Engle 2001), ergo taking account for all previous time periods. GARCH (1,1) is 
the most common model to use in empirical research. The first “1” stands for the inclusion of 
one ARCH-term in the equations, that the variance is based on the previous days squared 
residuals (Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 1997, 483). The second “1” is the inclusions of one 
GARCH-term, which makes the equations also consider a blend between the last periods 
return and squared residuals in modeling the variance (Reider 2009). Inclusion of the 
GARCH-term can be seen in the equation bellow:  
 𝜎!! = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝑎!!!! + 𝛽!𝜎!!!!                                       (4.8) 
 
One more modification has to be mentioned. GARCH-models can be both symmetrical 
and asymmetrical. The model presented above is symmetrical, negative and positive shocks 
are given equal weight. However, in the world of finance the reality is that negative news 
often has much bigger impact on volatility than good news has on relaxing these fluctuations. 
For example, the EGARCH-model is specified to take this fact into account (Alberg, Shalit, 
and Yosef 2008). I will use this to further test the empirical results. For a good introduction to 
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ARCH and GARCH models see Engle (2001). For a further discussion around alternative 
GARCH-specifications, see Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) and Straumann (2005). 
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5 Empirical results 
	  
In this chapter, I present the empirical results.41 I will first look at the results from the event 
study, and thereafter the GARCH-model. It is important to remember that these two models 
set out to measure two different aspects of how political change is assumed to affect financial 
markets. The event model measures abnormal returns in the periods of political change. A 
significant result will imply that periods of political transitions are connected to higher or 
lower abnormal changes in financial market value. The GARCH-model will indeed measure 
the mean value in these periods as well, but it will, also bring in another aspect: the volatility 
or variance of markets in these periods. After the results are laid out, different robustness 
tests on the analysis will be conducted. Finally, I will sum up the results and discuss the 
overall level of support for the different hypotheses from the previous chapter.    
 
5.1 Event study analysis 
The event study calculates abnormal returns in periods of political change. After removing 
events that had a too short estimation or event window, is the dataset left with 265 events of 
leadership change. 42 43 As I stated in the last chapter, the value of running a market model 
instead of the constant-mean model is dependent on the value of R2 for the individual's 
events. That is to say, how much of the variance in national stock market indexes is picked up 
by the model. The mean value of R2 across all events is 0.3, which is acceptably high. 
However, the value varies greatly across events and countries. Some have argued that these 
values reflect how efficient the market are (Bramante, Petrella, and Zappa 2013), and it is 
expected that markets have different levels of efficiency. Still, it could also come down to 
model specification, for instance that the regional benchmark chosen for that country is a 
poor yardstick for that national stock market index. I do, however, argue that the market 
model is a good fit for my data and that the R2 values are acceptable looking across all 
events. Still, an alternative way of estimating is tested in the robustness-tests later.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41 I use Stata v13.0 as the statistical software for all analysis in this chapter.  42 Some countries had two or more incumbent changes inside the same month, but in the results reported that is 
only coded as one event. The study was performed again with these cases included, counting these months 
twice, but it did not change the results significantly.   43 A list of the leadership changes identified can be found in the Appendix.  
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics of R-squared after regression 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
R-squared 0.3052835 0.1976 0.0021263 0.8788874 
Note: R-squared has values between 0 and 1, where 1 indicate that noting is left in the residuals and that, 
therefore, all variance is explained by the independent variables (Skog 2010, 224).  
 
As the dependent variable, I calculate average and cumulative abnormal returns, inside 
each event window. Average abnormal returns (AAR) are the mean value for the abnormal 
return in the event window. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are the sum of all the 
abnormal return in the event window. After the first regression I will focus on average 
abnormal returns, however, results using cumulative abnormal returns do not show any 
differing results.  
To check the model fit, I preform some diagnostic test on the residuals after each model. 
The Shapiro-Francia W-test reported for all model specifications, test the normality of 
residuals (Shapiro and Francia 1972). H0 for this test states that the data are normally 
distributed, and therefore with a p-value bellow 0.05 would this assumption be rejected. 
However, the test does not reach significance in any of the model specification, leading to the 
conclusion that I cannot reject that the residuals are normally distributed. Also, semi-robust 
standard error should give exact estimates, as “[t]hey provide unbiased standard errors that 
are robust to deviations in normality of the residuals.” (Brunner 2009, 166).  
The first two models in the table 5.2 bellow only consider the actual month of leader 
change, while the others takes the whole event window into account.44 For the first two is no 
significant effect found, however, when taking the whole event window into account the 
variable becomes significant on 0.05-level. All the coefficients below are positive, implying 
that returns are significantly higher in the event window than what is estimated based on the 
prior 24-month estimation window. It is opposite of what is proposed by H1a, and the 
presented theory. It indicates that, across all events, the trend seems to be that financial 
market reacts positively to changes in the sitting incumbent. However, since the results only 
are statistical significant in the case where the whole event window is taken into account, the 
results are not seen as very robust; significance could be due to higher number of 
observations in the last two models. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44 This increases the number of observations from 265 to 795, since each event window contains three months: 
one month prior to the event, the event month, and one month after the event.  
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Table 5.2: Event study regression in the month of power transitions 
 CAR 
Only month of 
change 
 AAR 
Only month of 
change 
CAR 
Event window 
AAR 
Event window 
Constant 1.742 
(1.192) 
0.581 
(0.397) 
1.688** 
(0.682) 
0.536** 
(0.228) 
Shapiro-Francia 
W-test (p-value) 0.49987 0.49987 0.49988 0.49988 
N 265 265 795 795 
Note: Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses.  
**significant on 0.05-level 
  
  
These initial results apply to all types of change in the de facto incumbent, also does 
happening between party colleagues. The next model only includes events where the changes 
also entailed a change in party-affiliations of the leader. Of the 265 power transfers, 79 are 
coded with a change in party affiliations, meaning that more than half of the changes 
occurred between incumbents with the same party affiliations.45 The first two models in table 
5.3 show the regression only for those cases where a party change occurs, first for only the 
month of change and then for the whole event window, while the latter shows the regression 
with these party changes taken out. None of the change in party variables becomes 
significant, rejecting H1c. The last two models include only the other power transfers, those 
where no party change occurred. The coefficients are again only significant when I include 
the full event window. However, coefficients become slightly more positive when I remove 
events with party changes (compared to table 5.2). Still, this is only a minor effect. What is 
interesting, though, is that it seems that positive effect from leader changes comes from those 
cases where the incumbent is changed but no policy change occurs. Indicating that the 
positive effect observed in table 5.2 is due to the changes where only the incumbent, but not 
the party is replaced. 
 
Table 5.3: Event study regression in the month of power transitions 
 AAR 
Change in party 
 AAR 
Change in party 
Event window (EW) 
AAR 
No change in 
party 
AAR 
No change in 
party (EW) 
Constant 0.150 
(0.614) 
0.107 
(0.390) 
0.699 
(0.500) 
0.688** 
(0.276) 
Shapiro-Francia 
W-test (p-value) 0.49988 0.49988 0.49988 0.49988 
N 79 208 186 587 
Note: Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses.  
**significant on 0.05-level 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45 Since no such variable exist in Archigos, I used the NELDA-dataset for this information.  
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Looking into the abnormal returns on the individual leadership changes reveals a large 
range of market responses to changing the sitting incumbent; from generating large negative 
abnormal returns in these periods, to positive market responses. In the appendix there is a 
complete list of all 265 power transfers and the cumulative abnormal return for each of them, 
with a t-test for each coefficient. Just too exemplify the difference, figure 1 shows abnormal 
return in the event window for two power transfers in the United Kingdom. The first is when 
Margaret Thatcher takes over as prime minister in May 1979; the other is when she leaves 
office for her party colleague John Major in November 1990. What becomes apparent is the 
huge difference in how the market react to these two changes, the abnormal returns are 
significantly negative during Thatcher’s takeover; while they are significantly positive when 
Major takes power. This is a similar effect to that found in Brazil and the election and re-
elections of Lula; the negative abnormal return only happens when the actual party change is 
present. In the case when only the leader, figurehead, is changed the markets seems to react 
positively. It is also in accordance with the results from table 5.3, that only leader changes 
where the party is changed as well, do I observed significantly positive returns. However, 
both the Brazil- and UK-case reports negative abnormal returns in situation where also the 
party is changed. Still, no such effect is found in the event study analysis across all countries. 
Just as a reminder, the abnormal returns are the difference between the estimated normal 
returns, based on the previous 24 months, and the real returns in the three months 
surrounding the transfer of power. 
 
Figure 5.1: Example from Great Britain 
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There are also huge differences in responses between countries. Looking at regressions 
for the US and Spain illustrate this. Both experience six power transfers during the time 
period I investigate, but a regression on average abnormal returns in the defined event 
window reveals very different market responses to political change. 46 In the US, I observe 
significant negative abnormal returns in their periods of change, while Spain experience the 
opposite in having positive abnormal returns in transition's periods. These findings are 
summarized in table 5.4.  
 
Table 5.4: Event study analysis, USA vs. Spain 
 AAR  
USA 
AAR  
Spain 
Constant -1.834** 
(0.531) 
1.471** 
(0.635) 
Shapiro-Francia W-test (p-
value) 0.49987 0.49987 
N 18 18 
Note: Semi-robust standard error in parentheses.  
**significant on 0.05-level 
 
Using my supporting hypotheses as a starting point, I now go on to examine whether 
there are institutional or partisanship explanations for these widely different results in regard 
to abnormal returns in periods of political change. These variables relate to the theoretical 
expectations that I made earlier in chapter 3. Following Bernhard and Lebland (2006), I use 
the average abnormal returns as the dependent variable and add explanatory variables. 47 The 
results are given in table 5.5 bellow. Model 1 and 2 show only the institutional variables, first 
only the month of the power transfer, and than in the event window of three months around 
these events. The clearest finding from the table is that having an independent central bank 
systematically lead to higher abnormal returns through periods of political change. It also 
changes the constant to become negative, though not significant. It confirms H2c, that if 
monetary policy is lead by an independent institution that removes some of the uncertainty 
around policy changes, and I observe positive abnormal returns in periods of political change. 
A weaker finding, democracies show negative abnormal returns, which is the opposite of 
what is assumed by H1a. However, the result is only present in the case where all event 
months were included, as opposed to only the event month. Another weak effect is related to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46 The reason for N=18 in both models is that for each event is an event period of three months defined. If only 
the event month is used is the variable only becomes significant on 0.1-level, but coefficients are similar.  47 I also did the same regression using cumulative abnormal returns as the dependent variable, for all practical 
purposes it reveals the same effects.  
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plurality electoral systems, as they show significant negative abnormal returns in two of the 
model specifications. It partly confirms H2d. A government change in plurality systems 
potentially means a much stricter and faster change in policy than in PR systems (Knutsen 
2011b), leading to potentially more risk for the investor that is reflected in the negative 
abnormal returns. The coefficients related to partisanship indicate no significant effect. 
However, do note that the coefficient for change to the political left is more negative and 
closer to being statistically significant in all specifications compared to changes to a right-
wing incumbent. Indicating that changes to the political left generally generate higher 
negative values of abnormal returns in periods of political change. Since change to a right-
wing executive also entails a change of party, it is not surprising that also these change report 
negative abnormal returns. Still, none of the partisan-variable becomes statistically 
significant in these models.  
 
Table 5.5: Event study, intuitions and partisanship  
 Institutions 
Month of 
event 
Institutions 
Event window 
Partisanship 
Month of 
event 
Partisanship 
Event window 
All 
Month of 
event 
All 
Event 
window 
Dummy 
democracy 
 
-1.371 
(1.161) 
-1.639** 
(0.698) 
  -1.205 
(1.192) 
-1.582** 
(0.702) 
Independent 
central bank 
 
2.569** 
(1.189) 
2.579*** 
(0.682) 
  2.560** 
(1.234) 
2.565*** 
(0.689) 
PR 
 
 
0.383 
(1.040) 
0.422 
(0.595) 
  0.381 
(1.039) 
0.422 
(0.595) 
Plurality 
 
  
-0.918 
(0.923) 
-0.905* 
(0.530) 
  -0.869 
(0.920) 
-0.886* 
(0.529) 
Change 
Left 
 
  -1.606 
(1.354) 
-1.450 
(1.291) 
-1.663 
(1.321) 
-1.533 
(0.123) 
Change 
Right 
 
  -0.738 
(0.988) 
-0.864 
(0.917) 
0.022 
(1.075) 
-0.139 
(0.954) 
Constant 
 
 
-0.473 
(1.479) 
-0.255 
(0.870) 
0.815* 
(0.459) 
0.659 
(0.239) 
-0.481 
(1.510) 
-0.250 
(0.876) 
Shapiro-
Francia W-test 
(p-value) 
0.49982 0.49982 0.49987 0.49987 0.49982 0.49982 
N 256 770 263 791 256 770 
Note: Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses; levels of statistical significance are indicated by asterisks: * 
significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
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The last hypotheses proposed above were connected to developing economies. The 
empirical data also here seems to contradict the theory, and refute hypotheses 4a. According 
to table 5.6, developing countries have significantly higher abnormal returns around these 
events. However, this result does not seem to be very robust when controlling for the other 
independent variables; even though it reaches significance on 10%-level in the last model. It 
implies that the difference in reaction from the markets on political change is not different in 
developing and developed countries. Other variables, like independent central bank, explain 
this difference better, after what is observed in this event study analysis.  
 
Table 5.6: Event study, developing countries 
 Developing 
Month of event 
Developing 
Event Window 
All 
Month of event 
All 
Event window 
Developing 
 
  
1.676* 
(0.989) 
1.643** 
(0.573) 
1.492 
(1.204) 
1.388* 
(0.685) 
Dummy 
Democracy 
 
  -0.576 
(1.352) 
-0.952 
(0.795) 
Independent 
central bank 
 
  2.301* 
(1.221) 
2.262*** 
(0.685) 
PR 
 
 
  0.287 
(1.036) 
0.333 
(0.593) 
Plurality 
 
 
  -1.353 
(1.020) 
-1.317** 
(0.580) 
Change Left 
 
 
  -1.558 
(1.394) 
-1.470 
(1.280) 
Change Right 
 
 
  0.322 
(1.083) 
0.113 
(0.950) 
Constant 
 
 
0.103 
(0.423) 
0.116 
(0.242) 
-1.119 
(1.657) 
-0.802 
(0.943) 
Shapiro-Francia 
W-test (p-value) 0.49987 0.49987 0.49982 0.49982 
N 263 791 256 770 
Note: Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses; levels of statistical significance are indicated by asterisks: * 
significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
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5.2 GARCH-model 
The results from the individual leader changes in the event study showed a wide range of 
market responses. A natural thing to systematically investigate next is then if the variance or 
volatility is measurably higher in periods of leadership change than other time periods. 
Therefore, I employ a GARCH-model, which can model the variance in the return of stock 
market indexes. Again I use equations 4.5 as a starting point, to control for international 
factors with the regional index and the change of price in gold and oil. The first two of these 
are significant through all specifications, indicating that they co-vary with the dependent 
variable. However, the variable for change in the price of oil does not, implying that this 
aspect poorly explains the variations in the national stock market indexes.  
Table 5.7 shows the simplest model, only including the event window, same as for the 
event study, and a post event period of six months after this to compare with the event 
window.48 The mean equations indicates a weakly significant coefficient, at the 10% level, 
for the event window, pointing towards that these periods may have higher mean returns. 
Indeed, this is the same (unexpected) direction of the effect as in the event study model. 
However, and equally interesting, the GARCH-models also measure volatility. What 
becomes apparent is that the event window has higher volatility, also when we control for the 
post event period in the second model bellow. The post-event window, the six months 
following the event window, does not reach statically significance but has a negative sign of 
the coefficient implying lower levels of volatility in these periods.  
In the third model, in table 5.7, I include a variable for party change. In contrast to the 
event model, this variable here becomes negative and significant in the mean model. 
Indicating that these types of changes lead to negative abnormal returns, confirming the case-
based evidence from Great Britain in the previous section. Also, the positive effect of the 
event period becomes even stronger positive and significant at the 5%-level when this 
variable is included. When it comes to the variance equations, no significant effect is 
observed in regards to party change; implying that these periods do not have a significant 
effect on volatility. This is in contrast to the event period, which shows higher level of 
volatility for all model specifications in table 5.7. A preliminary conclusions from this, is 
then that periods of change in general lead to higher volatility, but not when a party change is 
present. However, in regards to the mean change in return, a party change tends to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48 A six month post event window is suggest by Campello (2007) 
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associated with negative returns, while change inside the party lead to significantly positive 
returns in stock markets.   
 
Table 5.7: GARCH (1,1). Event window 
 Δ National stock 
market index 
Δ National stock 
market index 
Δ National stock 
market index 
Mean equation    
Δ MSCI 0.497*** 
(0.016) 
 
0.497*** 
(0.016) 
0.498*** 
(0.016) 
Change in gold prices -0.008** 
(0.004) 
 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
Change in oil prices 0.019 
(0.025) 
 
0.019 
(0.025) 
0.021 
(0.025) 
Event window 0.396* 
(0.224) 
 
0.395* 
(0.226) 
0.544** 
(0.248) 
Post event window  -0.060 
(0.171) 
 
 
Party change   -0.560** 
(0.278) 
 
Constant 0.528*** 
(0.057) 
 
0.533*** 
(0.061) 
0.535*** 
(0.061) 
Variance equation    
Event window 0.963** 
(0.497) 
 
1.058** 
(0.500) 
1.359** 
(0.473) 
Post event window  -0.259 
(0.848) 
 
  
Party change   -1.271 
 (0.972) 
 
Constant -0.280 
(0.275) 
 
-0.270 
(0.282) 
-0.309 
(0.289) 
ARCH 0.129*** 
(0.016) 
 
0.129*** 
(0.016) 
0.126*** 
(0.016) 
GARCH 0.859*** 
(0.017) 
 
0.859*** 
(0.017) 
0.862*** 
(0.017) 
Log pseudolikelihood -43666.12 -43665.89 -43661.13 
AIC 87 350.25 87 353.79 73909.06 
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Shapiro-Francia W-test 
(p-value) 0.24238 0.24238 0.24238 
Modified Bhargava et 
al. Durbin-Watson 1.742 1.742 1.742 
N 13 685 13 685 13 685 
Note: Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses; levels of statistical significance are indicated by asterisks: * 
significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
 
As with the event study analysis, I examine if partisanship and institutions could affect level 
of volatility. The results from this are in table 5.8 bellow. The first model contains all the 
institutional variables included in the analysis. From the mean equations, the results from the 
event study are confirmed in relations to the effect of independent central banks. Going to the 
variance equations, the event window behaves the same way as in the previous model. One 
new finding here, is, however, that democracy seems to have lower volatility, corroborating 
H2d. So, even though, the event study showed negative abnormal returns for democracy, the 
volatility is lower for these countries. It implies that it might be a democratic premium but 
that markets are more stable through the change in the incumbent in these regimes. This 
observation is also reflected in the conclusion of Knutsen (2011a), that dictatorships 
economic performance varies much more than in democracies.  Note that, the mean equation 
gives no significant effect from democracy, reflecting the finding of the event study model.  
In the next model, I include the partisanship variables, comparing countries with left-
wing incumbents against countries with right-wing incumbents; as a reminder, this is based 
on economic policy using data from the World Bank. As with the event study, the mean 
equation does not provide any significant results. However, the variance equation confirms 
H3b; that right executives are associated with lower volatility. This results conflicts with 
Leblang and Mukherjee (2005) prediction that the right-wing executive, or the prospect of a 
right-wing elections victory, should increase stoke markets trading volume and therefore both 
the volatility and mean value of the stock market. However, it lends support to Herron (2000) 
finding that right-wing incumbents reduce volatility. The partisan variables also seem to 
explain some of the variations in the event window, as that variable becomes insignificant in 
this specifications.   
In the third specifications, I include a variable for developing countries. Again, the mean 
equation confirms the finding from the event model, which is opposite too the assumed link 
made by H4a; developing countries seems to have higher returns. However, in according to 
H4b, these countries are also associated with higher volatility. Implying higher returns, but 
also higher variance in these countries. This suggests that periods of political change in these 
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countries are associated with higher market activity, for some reason, which leads to higher 
returns but also higher volatility.  
The last model includes all the variables from the previous models. The mean equations 
do not change substantially. Regarding the variance equations the outcome in regards to the 
right-wing executive and developing are robust to controlling for the other independent 
variables. However, the democracy- and plurality-variables change significantly in this 
model. The democracy variable goes from being negative and significant to becoming 
positive and insignificant. The plurality system variable stays negative, but turns significant 
in the last model, implying that plurality system have lower volatility.  
 
Table 5.8: GARCH(1,1). Institutions, partisanship, and developing countries  
 Δ National stock 
market index 
Δ National stock 
market index 
Δ National stock 
market index 
Δ National stock 
market index 
Mean equation     
Δ MSCI 0.502*** 
(0.016) 
 
0.498*** 
(0.016) 
0.500*** 
(0.016) 
0.501*** 
(0.016) 
Change in gold 
prices 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
 
-0.008* 
(0.004) 
-0.008* 
(0.004) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
Change in oil 
prices 
0.019 
(0.023) 
 
0.014 
(0.026) 
0.024 
(0.027) 
0.019 
(0.024) 
Event window 0.466* 
(0.235) 
 
0.509** 
(0.235) 
0.369* 
(0.222) 
0.558** 
(0.230) 
Dummy 
democracy 
-0.080 
(0.156) 
 
  0.293 
(0.233) 
Independent 
central bank 
0.280* 
(0.154) 
 
  0.248 
(0.162) 
PR 0.127 
(0.166) 
 
  0.166 
(0.171) 
Plurality -0.104 
(0.119) 
 
  -0.157 
(0.120) 
Left executive  0.062 
(0.187) 
 
 0.158 
(0.191) 
Right executive  -0.049 
(0.147) 
 
 0.049 
(0.169) 
Developing    0.357*** 0.497*** 
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(0.132) 
 
(0.176) 
Constant 0.358 
(0.219) 
0.573 
(0.130) 
0.461*** 
(0.065) 
 
-0.106 
(0.265) 
Variance equations    
Event window 1.143** 
(0.503) 
 
0.710 
(0.509) 
0.935** 
(0.380) 
0.814** 
(0.425) 
Dummy 
democracy 
-0.902*** 
(0.235) 
 
  0.138 
(0.263) 
Independent 
central bank 
0.330 
(0.362) 
 
  0.062 
(0.274) 
PR 0.279 
(0.254) 
 
  0.086 
(0.209) 
Plurality -0.303 
(0.209) 
 
  -0.492*** 
(0.167) 
Left executive  -0.374 
(0.267) 
 
 -0.043 
(0.203) 
Right executive  -0.862*** 
(0.202) 
 
 -0.459** 
(0.189) 
Developing   0.883*** 
(0.160) 
 
0.901*** 
(0.204) 
Constant 0.098 
(0.439) 
0.483* 
(0.483) 
 
-0.092 
(0.244) 
0.135 
(0.371) 
ARCH 0.120*** 
(0.014) 
0.141*** 
(0.016) 
0.140*** 
(0.016) 
0.142*** 
(0.014) 
GARCH 0.866*** 
(0.016) 
0.843*** 
(0.017) 
0.836*** 
(0.018) 
0.829*** 
(0.017) 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -39661.51 -39249.38 -43616.62 -36542.46 
AIC 79357.03 78524.75 87255.24 73130.92 
Shapiro-Francia 
W-test (p-value) 0.18977 0.17966 0.24239 0.14311 
Modified 
Bhargava et al. 
Durbin-Watson 
1.740 1.729 1.742 1.730 
N 12420 12195 13685 11390 
Note: Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses; levels of statistical significance are indicated by asterisks: * 
significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level 	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Before moving on to the robustness test, I quickly review the ARCH and GARCH-terms 
in the model. They stayed rather stable through all the specifications, and are positive and 
statistically significant indicating that the variance from the month before affect the 
conditional variance on the current month; “The large yesterdays shock, the larger todays 
volatility.” (Brunner 2009, 165). Also, the relatively large GARCH-term shows that there is 
high volatility in the data. Still, it is important to note that the ARCH- and GARCH-term 
combined is smaller than 1, meaning that the model is mean reverting. If it had been higher 
than 1, an important assumption behind the model - that the variance is stationary - would 
have been violated. In additions to the normality-test, I have also included a modified 
Durbin-Watson test for panel data to check for autocorrelations in the residuals (Bhargava, 
Franzini, and Narendranathan 1982). The Durbin-Watson test statistics goes from 0 to 4, and 
scores of 2 would indicate no first order autocorrelations. So a score of around 1.7, which is 
the case for all my GARCH (1,1)-models, show some indication of positive autocorrelation in 
the residuals, but no reason to believe skewed estimates. 	  
5.2.1 Causality 
I have already highlighted the difficulty of making causal statements in social sciences. Since 
a controlled experiment between change in the political leadership and financial market 
output is difficult, and maybe impossible, to imagine we are left with methods that mimic this 
control to look and test for causal links. The event analysis is one such method, trying to 
estimate what would happen if the leadership change had not occurred, and then calculate the 
difference between the estimated values and actual returns. Counterfactual analysis is 
obviously not without flaws, and we shall see, the method is highly sensitive to change in the 
length of the estimation and event window, and the calculations method of the estimated 
returns.  
However, the GARCH-model is a statistical model that identifies co-variance between 
variables; in this case that higher volatility and change in political leadership co-varies. Still, 
this does not comfortably tell us which variable is the cause and which is the effect.49 
Through the theoretical argument presented earlier, I have argued that what causes this 
volatility is the uncertainty around future policy, and that then the directions of causality goes 
from the leadership change to the financial market output. Yet, it is clear from previous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49 ”Once a scholar identifies a clear co-variation between two facts – X and Y – he know that there are onlt two 
simple ways in which this co-variance can be logically understood: either X causes Y, or Y causes X.” (Moses 
and Knutsen 2007, 74) 
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research that economic factors often plays a central role in the voting decision of the 
electorate (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2009), and therefore, that is it plausible to argue that 
higher financial market volatility facilitates political change. However, Jones and Olken 
(2005) identify a type of leader change that could not be a consequence of economic factors, 
changes due to the natural death of leader. As the first robustness-test of my result, I run the 
GARCH (1,1)-model with the natural death of leader variable instead of the event variable. 
Since natural death among political leaders is a rare event, this obviously limits the number 
of observations considerably, which have the effect of possibly creating biased estimates 
(King and Zeng 2001). I only identify 9 such events in my dataset; these are described in the 
appendix 3. Yet, without expanding the time period investigated, I cannot increase the 
number of natural death of incumbent and therefore the following results are presented in 
table 5.9 with the precaution of possible biased estimates.  
 
Table 5.9: GARCH (1,1), with natural death of leader as independent variable 
 Δ National stock market index 
Mean equation  
Δ MSCI 0.498*** 
(0.016) 
Change in gold prices -0.008** 
(0.004) 
Change in oil prices 0.020 
(0.025) 
Event window (Natural death) -1.301 
(1.401) 
Constant 0.551*** 
(0.055) 
Variance equation  
Event window (Natural death)  3.196*** 
(0.844) 
Constant -0.234 
(0.263) 
ARCH 0.129*** 
(0.016) 
GARCH 0.859*** 
(0.017) 
Log pseudolikelihood -43660.53 
AIC 87339.05 
Shapiro-Francia W-test (p-value) 0.24238 
Modified Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson 1.745 
N 13685 
Note: Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses; levels of statistical significance are indicated by asterisks: * 
significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
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The results in table 5.9 are similar to those presented earlier: no significant mean effect, 
while the variance equations show higher volatility in the event window. One notable 
observation is that the variance coefficient is higher in this specification; this could be due to 
higher uncertainty in markets around future government with the death of the sitting 
incumbent. Also, in the mean equation the coefficient has turned negative, but still not 
significant. Even though these results are based on where few observations, they reconfirm 
the earlier findings with an independent variable that are not caused by the change in the 
dependent variable of the analysis.  
 
5.3 Robustness-test 
To check the robustness of my results, I conducted a series of different specification across 
the two model types used in the thesis. The two main findings from the analysis is, (1) no 
mean effect on stock market returns, but (2) higher volatility in these markets for periods of 
political change. For the event model it is specially the length and definition on the 
estimation and event window that could effect the results (MacKinlay 1997). The GARCH 
(1,1) analysis will be tested for other related model-specification, as the asymmetrical 
GARCH-model, also different numbers of ARCH and GARCH-term included and the 
inclusions of the ARCH-term in the mean equation (Näsström 2003). Some of the results 
have only been included in appendix 4.   
 
5.3.1 Event model 
As I already mentioned, an event study can be highly sensitive to the estimation and event 
window chosen. Different alternative specifications were tested, but none of them changed 
any of the results. One of the specifications implies expanding the event window to five 
months: two months’ prior and two month after the change. The reason for include a period 
prior to the actual change is due to the assumption that markets acquire some information 
about the change before it happens. Indeed, in the periods before a democratic election pools 
and analysis give investors information about what to expect. However, I have already 
mentioned a branch of change that cannot be picked up beforehand, change due to natural 
death. Also, sudden changes due to a coup d’état might happen without prior knowledge. 
However, these cases are very rare in the dataset, and removing all cases due to natural death 
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or irregular changes, do not affect the results in any significant way.50 Since I now expand 
my event window, I have to do the same with the estimation window. It is now set to 40 
months, since the estimation window should be at least eight times as long as the event 
window (Campello 2007). Expanding this also meant that some observation falls out, since 
they do not have 40 months prior to the event to estimate on. The results can be seen in table 
5.10 and are almost identical to those in table 5.2.  
 
Table 5.10: Event study with alternative event period (-2,+2) 
 CAR 
Only month of 
change 
 AAR 
Only month of 
change 
CAR 
Event window 
AAR 
Event window 
Constant 2.183 
(1.290) 
0.422 
(0.259) 
2.183** 
(0.567) 
0.522** 
(0.114) 
Shapiro-Francia 
W-test (p-value) 0.49983 0.49983 0.49983 0.49983 
N 245 245 1225 1225 
Note: Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses.  
**significant on 0.05-level 
  
	  	  	  
A longer event window would demand an estimation window spending over 4 years, 
which would stretch over a normal electoral cycle and, therefore, include past leadership 
changes in many of the estimation windows, which make the interpretations of the results 
harder since many of the events are included in each others estimation window. However, I 
also test shorter periods with only two months in the event window; one with only one-month 
prior and another with one-month after the event. I only included the coefficient from the 
month of change; however, the results from the event window were also statistically 
insignificant. It reaffirms that there are no abnormal returns observed in periods of political 
change. These results are found in table 5.11. 	  
Table 5.11: Event study, shorter event periods 
 CAR(-1) 
Only month of 
change 
 AAR(-1) 
Only month of 
change 
CAR(+1) 
Only month of 
change 
AAR(+1) 
Only month of 
change 
Constant 0.882 
(0.862) 
0.431 
(0.433) 
1.176 
(1.071) 
0.581 
(0.538) 
Shapiro-Francia 
W-test (p-value) 0.49991 0.49991 0.49991 0.49991 
N 279 278 278 277 
Note: Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses.  
**significant on 0.05-level 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50 Removed from office irregularly is a variable in the Archgios dataset, which includeds, among other thing, 
cuop or illegal seizure of power.  
	   69	  
	  
I also did the original analysis without those events that had leadership changes 
occurring in the estimation window. It reduced the number of cases but did not change the 
results significantly; for instants excluding all cases from Switzerland, which change 
incumbents every year in the time period investigated. Also, recoding the dependent variables 
in log like Brunner (2009) suggests, instead of absolute percentage (as equations 4.2), did not 
change the results notably.51  
In the earlier models I have used a market model to estimate normal performance, but 
there are alternative measure to calculate normal performance. Event though, the market 
model is the most used, the simplest method is by the constant mean return model (Campbell, 
Lo, and MacKinlay 1997, 154–155). The way to measure the advantage in using the market 
model over this simpler design is by the value of R-squared for the individual events, as 
reported in table 5.1. This can be thought of like the variance that the constant mean model 
cannot explain; since that model runs a regression without independent variables for each 
event. In the GARCH-model one of the indicators, change in the global prices of oil, poorly 
explained movement in the national stock market indexes.  However, preforming the constant 
mean method instead does not change the results any other way than to weaken the 
coefficients. The results from the cumulative and average abnormal returns in the event 
month are reported in table 5.12. 
 
Table 5.12: Event study analysis, constant mean return model 
 CAR  AAR 
Constant 1.204 
(1.215) 
0.360 
(0.407) 
Shapiro-Francia W-test (p-
value) 0.49987 0.49987 
N 265 265 
Note: Semi-robust standard error in parentheses.  
 
5.3.2 GARCH-tests 
In the GARCH (1,1) I also tried the same variants of event windows as for the event model, 
results reported in table 5.13. This show that the result connected to higher volatility is not 
robust when the event window is extended to five months, neither when the event window 
only include the month of event and the period following (+1). However, it remains 
significant, on a 5%-level, when we instead move the event window one month before the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51 Calculate return based on: Rt=100(lnPt – lnPt-1) 
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event (-1). This might indicate that much of the observed variance in the baseline model is 
due to volatility happing before the takeover, while the markets still might not know who 
takes over, or they know but still know little about policy priorities.  
 
Table 5.13: GARCH (1,1) Alternative event window specification 
 Δ National stock 
market index 
Δ National stock 
market index 
Δ National stock 
market index 
Mean equation    
Δ MSCI 0.497*** 
(0.016) 
0.497*** 
(0.016) 
0.497*** 
(0.016) 
Change in gold 
prices 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
Change in oil prices 0.019 
(0.024) 
0.019 
(0.025) 
0.019 
(0.025) 
Event window (-
2,+2) 
0.053 
(0.188) 
  
Event window (-1)  0.284 
(0.278) 
 
Event window (+1)   -0.284 
(0.284) 
Constant 0.541*** 
(0.058) 
0.537*** 
(0.057) 
0.553*** 
(0.057) 
Variance equation    
Event window (-
2,+2) 
0.558 
(0.466) 
  
Event window (-1)  1.208** 
(0.563) 
 
Event window (+1)   0.974 
(0.716) 
Constant -0.279 
(0.275) 
-0.279 
(0.275) 
-0.277 
(0.273) 
ARCH 0.128*** 
(0.016) 
0.129*** 
(0.016) 
0.129*** 
(0.016) 
GARCH 0.859*** 
(0.017) 
0.859*** 
(0.017) 
0.860*** 
(0.017) 
Log 
pseudolikelihood -43669.53 -43667.3 -43669.03 
AIC 87357.05 87352.61 87356.06 
Shapiro-Francia W-
test (p-value) 0.24238 0.24238 0.24238 
Modified Bhargava 
et al. Durbin-Watson 1.741 1.741 1.741 
N 13685 13685 13685 
Note: Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses; levels of statistical significance are indicated by asterisks: 
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
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I mentioned earlier the possibility for an asymmetrical ARCH-specification, with 
unequal weight on negative and positive shocks. It makes the model more complex, but also 
possibly closer to the real dynamics of the financial market. I did run an EGARCH (1,1) for 
all specifications shown above, but this did not substantially change any of the results. The 
simplest model, with only the event window included can be seen in table 5.14. Notice that 
the results of the diagnostic test show no improvement on the more parsimonious GARCH 
(1,1). The decision to use the GARCH (1,1) is also supported by the AIC-score, which is 
lower for the original model, indicating that the latter more complex models lose more of the 
inherent information of the data (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 44).52 53 
 
Table 5.14: EGARCH (1,1) 
 Δ National stock market index 
Mean equation  
Δ MSCI 0.515*** 
(0.017) 
Change in gold prices -0.009*** 
(0.003) 
Change in oil prices 0.028 
(0.029) 
Event window  0.375 
(0.279) 
Constant 0.572*** 
(0.053) 
Variance equation  
Event window  0.073** 
(0.029) 
Constant 0.093*** 
(0.020) 
EARCH 0.014 
(0.009) 
EGARCH 0.976*** 
(0.005) 
Log pseudolikelihood -43716.91 
AIC 87453.82 
Shapiro-Francia W-test (p-value) 0.24238 
Modified Bhargava et al. Durbin-Watson 1.745 
N 13685 
Note: Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses; levels of statistical significance are indicated by asterisks: 
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52 Akaike information criterion (AIC) is a measure to compare the relative quality between two models for a 
given set of data. “The idea behind the AIC is to “reward” parsimonious model by penalizing the log-likelihood 
for each parameter that is estimated.” (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 44) 53 Only the AIC-score is reported, but also the BIC-score from the models support this decision. 
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I experimented with including the ARCH-in-mean term in the models, and different 
numbers of ARCH- and GARCH-terms included, but none of these alternative specification 
changed the results.54 Also, recoded the dependent variables, as with the event study, log 
change instead of absolute percentage did not change any of the results reported.   	  	  
5.4 Summary and discussion of the main results 
This thesis has set out to answer the following research question: How do changes in political 
leadership affect financial markets? The empirical analysis has given one direct answer in 
that political change seems to induce higher volatility in financial markets. However, no 
evidence for any systematic difference in mean returns is observed; neither when using the 
event study model or the GARCH (1,1) model. My main tool in uncovering abnormal returns, 
the event model, showed few significant findings, and some results were rather contrary to 
what was deduced from the theoretical framework proposed earlier. The most surprising 
result was that abnormal returns are sometimes estimated to be positive in periods of political 
transition, though it is important to note that this was generally not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. The results do not change when only looking at those changes that also 
entail a change of party. This implies that markets are, as far as this analysis can observe, 
stable through periods of political change; no abnormal effect is observed across all events.  
So, the empirical results do, at least, seem to indicate that leadership changes do not, 
generally, induce lower returns in financial markets. In other words, changes in the political 
leadership does not seem hurt finance when it comes to returns, despite the strong theoretical 
arguments indicating that it might do just that. It could be that business actors have a much 
better idea of future cost and gain than assumed by the theoretical model presented above, 
and that prices adjust to this information quickly so no effect is seen on returns. Also, some 
changes are obviously wanted by the investors, for instance regimes threating to expropriate 
assets, and these cases are not controlled for in the model. However, identifying them might 
be a difficult processes, as different investors hold different preferences. I do, however, find 
evidence, although mixed, pointing towards that party change affect markets negatively, 
while change between incumbents of the same party lead to positive responses. The latter 
shift may be said to represent less policy uncertainty as incumbents from the same party have 
the same policy priorities, at least often, and is thus not really conflicting with the theoretical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54 The results from this can be found in appendix 4.  
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model. This is reaffirmed by the “mean equation” in the GARCH (1,1) model, showing a 
negative significant coefficient for party change; while the event window still shows a 
positive effect.    
Still, looking behind the aggregated results, some cases and countries show significant 
effects on financial market stemming from periods of political change. However, no 
“general” response is to be found; some countries’ financial market reacts positively to 
leadership change, whereas other more often react negatively. As an example of this, I 
highlighted the US, which in periods of political transitions experience negative abnormal 
returns. Spain, on the other hand, experiences the opposite with positive abnormal returns in 
these periods; this can be seen in table 5.4. One possible explanatory factor for this result 
could be due to different electoral system in the two countries: the US having a plurality 
system while Spain has a proportional electoral system. Through the theoretical argument and 
model presented, I expected that plurality system would generate lower returns in periods of 
political change, since a new incumbent most likely will have a majority backing, he or she 
will have more freedom to suddenly change or revers policy choices. In proportional systems 
one party rarely has majority, and therefore does the composition of parliament change less 
abruptly. Policies are therefore often revised instead of reversed. Yet, when looking at all 
countries I only find weak evidence (statistical significant on 10%-level) for that plurality 
system systematically creates negative abnormal returns; and no effect when it comes to 
countries following proportional electoral rules.  
Another example is between the two Scandinavian neighbors Norway and Denmark, 
which, as can be seen in the appendix, have very different stock market replies on change in 
the countries incumbent.55 While Norway show negative abnormal returns for all transition 
periods since 1970, except in 1997 when Jagland replaced party colleague Brundtland one 
year before the general elections. However, there was no reason to believe that Jagland would 
change the policy line from Brundland and, therefore, no reason to expect negative abnormal 
returns in that period. Denmark have the opposite trend, with positive abnormal returns for all 
political changes, expect in 1982 when Schlüter became the first prime minister from the 
conservative peoples party.56 This is a kind of uncertainty that have not been addressed in 
this thesis. A new party with no governmental experience makes it hard for market actors to 
know consequences of their policy. Also, it is worth noting that this is a change from a left-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55 Note that Norway and Denmark hav the same electoral system: Proportional representation.  56 The list of event can be seen in appendix 2, with Norway having id: 155-162 and Denmark id: 163-168. 
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wing incumbent to one that is coded as a right-wing incumbent, a type of change many would 
expect to be welcomed by financial markets. Still, the abnormal returns indicate that this 
change lead to negative abnormal returns on the Danish stock market. This re-confirms the 
observation from Brazil, that it is not partisanship but uncertainty around new policy that 
gives negative affect to market. However, again is the result restricted to certain cases, and no 
results are found across all countries in the analysis.  
The reason for the mixed result might come down to factors that I have not controlled for 
in the model. For instants, difference might be due to some country specific effects. This 
could be connected to which time of year the change occurs or what weekday.  It has for long 
been known in finance that certain calendar effects occur in the market, two of the best know 
are the “January effect” and the “Monday effect”; these predict higher returns in January and 
lower returns on Mondays (Sullivan, Timmermann, and White 2001). Since some countries 
hold elections and change incumbents on specific dates or days of the week, for instance 
Switzerland that change incumbent every January, such facts could affect the results.57 Also, 
specific events could affect markets or change in incumbents that have not been controlled 
for in the models. This could be related to crises or special circumstances, like 9/11 or 
monetary situations like the EMU-crises in 1992.58 Special events and time specific effects 
has been outside the scope of this thesis, but could give a starting-point for later research into 
this issue; I will summarize more suggestions to future research in the next, and last, chapter.  
When all explanatory and control variables are added to the event study analysis, only 
one result is robust across specifications: countries with an independent central bank seem to 
have higher abnormal returns through periods of political change. I argue that this is due to 
less policy uncertainty in periods of political change, since monetary policy would not be 
affected by the change. Also, the constant term in the event model becomes negative when 
this variable is added, implying that those countries without an independent central bank 
seem to experience negative abnormal returns in these periods. However, it should be noted 
that this result is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Hypothesis H2c predicts 
that having an independent body in charge of monetary policy should create less negative 
abnormal returns, and the direction of this assumed relationship is corroborated in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 I tried running the GARCH (1,1) model with only the event window and a dummy for January. The results 
showed a positive effect on the mean equation for January, confirming earlier findings that returns are higher in 
this month, but it did not change the effect of the event window in the mean or variance equation.  58 In the days following 9/11 the US stock markets were closed, which affected all international markets. The 
crises of the European Monetary System lasted from 12-30.september in 1992, with devaluations of several 
currencies and countries withdrawing form the European monetary system. 
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analysis by a significant positive coefficient. However, it is not all clear why it should be 
strongly positive, indicating higher returns than expected in these periods of transition; as the 
hypotheses only proposed less abnormal returns through creating less uncertainty, not a 
relationship where having than independent central bank should lead to positive returns. In 
the previous literature Cukierman et al. (1993), among others, found that independent central 
bank lead to higher economic growth for developing countries, while the same effect is not 
found among industrialized economies. So, it could be such effects are driving also the 
observation made in my empirical analysis; later research should try to address this issue 
further.  
For developing countries, the theory predicted larger negative abnormal returns and 
higher volatility; only the latter get support. It would indicate that leadership changes in 
developing countries are associated with higher market activity in general; leading to higher 
mean returns and a larger variance in prices, increasing the observed volatility. It should be 
easier to see the reaction of political change on financial markets in these types of countries 
due to a weaker state. Still, in the event model the effect on abnormal returns are fragile, and 
disappears when controlling for the other explanatory variables.   
The GARCH-model confirmed several of the findings from the event model through its 
“mean equation”. Importantly, leadership changes are not found to generally hurt stock 
markets in this model either, contrasting with the theoretical expectation presented above. 
However, the GARCH-model, also presents results relevant for the volatility of markets in its 
“variance equations”, and here the event window defined around leadership changes gave 
significant results. This corroborates the findings from Leblang and Bernhard (2006, 90), 
which concludes that political change effect the volatility but not the mean value of the 
currency exchange rate. Across almost all specifications, the variance coefficient for the 
event window stayed positive and statistically significant at conventional level, which 
indicated higher volatility in markets in these periods of political change. This result is also 
tested, and reaffirmed, with a variable that cannot cause the leadership change, change in a 
countries incumbent due to natural death of the leader. This strengthen the belief in that the 
causal relationship is, as assumed by figure 1.3, that change in political leadership affect 
financial market output. However, this does not mean that financial market performance has 
no effect on elections or who is to govern the country, but that there is an effect going from 
change in the political leadership to financial market performance. 
From the robustness-test results of the alternative event windows, it appears that it is 
mostly what happens during the period of one month before the event-month together with 
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the month of the event (i.e. the leadership change) that drive the results in regards to 
volatility. I argue that this increased volatility likely stems from the uncertainty associated 
with how the new leaders should behave, or that they still have not learned the policy 
priorities of the new incumbent. For unregulated and sudden changes, I would assume that 
the effect comes with a longer time-lag, as markets have not got a chance to adjust in the 
same manner. For a lot of the democracies in the sample the month before a leader change is 
the month of the elections, which previous research clearly have shown to affect financial 
markets. One of this is Sweden, which has held elections every month before the coded 
leadership change from Archigos.59 At what time the investor learns about the leadership 
change might vary from country to country and between different elections. For example, 
some elections are fairly predictable, while others are not. Even in autocratic settings it could 
be clear who is going to take-over power, for instance, a son taking over after his father. 
Since these are an effect that seems unique for each case, to uncover more about it qualitative 
studies are needed. Hypotheses generated by these studies may again be tested on a large-N 
scale if theory dictates that is might be a general trend.  
When it comes to having an independent central bank, the results show that these 
countries have positive abnormal returns in periods of political change, but no effect is 
registered in connection to volatility. Leblang and Bernhard (2006) conclude that if monetary 
policy is left to an independent body, volatility in financial markets should be lower. That this 
variable comes up close to null and insignificant implies that having an independent central 
bank does not matter in regards to how much volatility a country’s stock market experience.  
However, this makes it difficult to draw strict conclusions on H2d; that independent central 
bank should lead to less volatility.  
A robust finding from the analysis is that countries with a right-wing incumbent 
experience lower volatility. The theoretical backing for this finding is that their business-
friendly policy agenda calms markets down in periods of policy uncertainty. It seems to 
partly corroborate the theory that financial actors care about the ideological position of the 
incumbent. However, this is only seen in regards to volatility; when it comes to mean returns 
no significant results are picked up by this analysis. Still, the latter result could be due to 
market actors hedging against the inflationary consequence of a left-wing incumbent by 
investing in the stock market (Bernhard and Leblang 2006, 6). This last argument is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59 There are two exceptions, where the role of prime minister of Sweden have been changed between leaders of 
the Swedish social democratic party without an elections during the month before: (1) Olaf Palme was 
assassinated in 1986, his party colleague Ingvar Carlsson took over; and (2) Ingvar Carlsson resigned as leader 
of the social democratic party and Göran Persson took office in 1996.  
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reflection over the conflicting previous results on the subject, for example, Santa-Clara and 
Valkanov (2003) finding higher returns under democratic presidents in the US, while 
Campello (2007) finds evidence for negative abnormal returns under left-wing incumbents in 
Latin America. Brunner (2009, 166) also argues that ideology and partisanship seemed to 
matter more in the period from 1965-1980 than in the latter period up to the present, he backs 
this up with empirical results from the Netherlands. Another possible explanation for why 
partisanship yielded few statistical significant results on mean returns is that many countries 
today have independent central banks guided by inflation targets, and one of the main reasons 
business actors’ fear left-wing policies is their priority of employment over inflation. Also, 
this could help explain the strong positive effect on having an independent central bank, as 
investors today seek out those countries with stable inflation targets and long-term monetary 
policy goals.  
The game theoretical model in chapter 3 provided a formalized version of the main 
argument of the thesis, and it is reasonable to try and summarize the findings in light of this 
model. To summarize the argument from the model, it describes an investment decision done 
under uncertainty around if the political status quo is kept or a new incumbent is to take 
power. It assumes that investors would base their investment decision on how they asses 
future revenue, and since future cost and gain are difficult to evaluate in period of uncertainty 
around future policy, investors would be careful in this setting. It predicts lower mean returns 
and higher volatility in stock market around events were political leaders are changed, 
because of the uncertainty that follows. Interestingly, except for the significant positive effect 
of having an independent central bank, none of the other independent variables – regime 
type, electoral system, partisanship, or wheatear the country is defined as developing – gave 
significant effects in regards to change in the expected value of financial markets. This may 
come down to investors having a better idea of future policy (with relevance for their 
financial investments) than originally assumed in the model. Even though I tested with 
different event windows, it could be that prices start to adjust prior to these time periods and 
that I, therefore, observe no effect.60 However, in regards to volatility, the results for the 
event period corroborated with the expectation from the model. Given that the market and the 
investors know less about future cost and gains, this is, as I would expect from the game 
theoretical model. Remember that, taking the future cost and gain put up against today’s cost 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Some countries hold elections a while before the incumebent is changed. One prominent example is the US, 
which holds elections in november and change incumebent in January. If we assume that polls predict a 
landslide elections, markets could adjust prices a long before the acctual change.  
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and reward, sets the price on a financial asset, formalized in equations 3.3. When the future 
cost and gain is more uncertain, it is more difficult to set the correct price on that asset, 
leading to investors holding very different expectations about these parameters. It explains 
the observed higher volatility in the data. Since it could be that higher volatility also affects a 
change in the incumbent, I tested the results with changes that could not be caused by more 
volatile markets: changes due to the natural death of the incumbent. The analysis with this as 
the independent variables gave the same results, and even stronger positive coefficient for 
variance. 
 
5.4.1 Summing of evidence for the different hypotheses 
Table 5.15 summarizes all the hypotheses from chapter 3, and gives indications about how 
they held up in the empirical analysis. Some of the assertions hold up, while many are 
rejected or justly partly corroborated. This last category is broad and includes the results that 
were not robust or only significant under some conditions. However, three of the main 
hypotheses are corroborated “in full”, namely those on: (1) higher volatility in periods of 
change; (2) independent central banks seem to remove the policy uncertainty and lead to 
higher abnormal returns in periods of political transition; (3) developing countries experience 
higher volatility in returns, which implies higher risks in these markets.  
One notable observation is that while the theoretical argument and the resulting 
hypotheses look to pair up negative abnormal returns and high volatility, the empirical results 
seem to do the opposite, even though, many of these results fails to reach statistical 
significance. It is possible to see higher volatility as a measure of risk, and something 
investors might try to avoid, causing lower returns. On the other hand could higher activity in 
markets, which would lead to higher returns, also increase the volatility (Leblang and 
Mukherjee 2005). As is clear from the previous literature, the exact sources of volatility in 
financial markets still remains somewhat of a puzzle, and further advances in this field might 
lead us to get better answers about the specific volatility findings, related to political 
leadership changes, in this thesis as well.  
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Table 5.15: Hypotheses summarized 	   Corroborated In-between Rejected 
H1a: A change in the national political leadership will affect 
financial markets, leading to lower mean values of stock 
markets 
 
  X 
H1b: A change in the national political leadership will create 
higher volatility in financial markets. 
 
X   
H1c: The negative effect of a change in executive leadership on 
mean returns is smaller when the change involves executives 
from the same party 
 
 X  
H1b: The assumed higher volatility with a change in the 
executive leadership is reduced when the change involves 
executives from the same party 
 
  X 
H2a: Leader changes in autocratic regimes reduces the 
expected return more than in democracies 
 
  X 
H2b: Leader changes in democratic regimes create less volatile 
financial market then leader change in autocracies. 
 
 X  
H2c: Having an independent central bank will create less 
uncertainty and less negative mean returns in periods of 
political leadership change 
   
X   
H2d: Independent central banks should lead to less volatility in 
markets through periods of leadership change 
 
  X 
H2e: Plurality system creates lower returns in periods of 
leadership change. 
 
 X  
H2f: Proportional electoral system creates less volatility in 
periods of leadership change 
 
  X 
H3a: Incumbent changes to the political left have stronger 
negative effects on financial markets than changes to the 
political right. 
 
 X  
H3b: Volatility is higher under left-wing executives, than under 
the right-wing incumbents 
 
 X  
H4a: Developed countries experience lower returns in periods 
of leadership change, than more developed economies 
 
  X 
H4b: Developed countries experience lower levels of volatility 
than emerging economies 
 
X   
 
80	   	  
6 Concluding remarks 
 
This thesis has set out to analyze the effect(s) that political change has on financial markets. 
More specifically, I have focused on how leadership changes affect national stock market 
indexes. It has shown that financial markets first and foremost react to such change with 
higher volatility. Even though I presented theory that predicted that also mean returns should 
be affected by these events, no such effect was found in the empirical analysis. I also tested 
for institutional and partisan difference in these results. What becomes apparent was that 
having an independent central bank is the strongest explanatory variable for having positive 
abnormal returns in the periods of political change. In regards to volatility, it affects the 
countries defined as “developing” the hardest, but also industrialized countries experience 
statistically significant higher volatility in these periods of political transition.  
Business actors and politicians operate in a world where they, arguably, are becoming 
increasingly dependent upon each other, illustrated by the public debate following the recent 
financial crises (see Bragues 2010). We know that financial development and stability are 
good indicators of, and possibly contributing factors to, economic growth and social 
development (Haber, North, and Weingast 2008; Lopez and Spiegel 2002). Hence, 
scrutinizing the relationship in this thesis could be crucial for many developing countries 
trying to establish stable financial markets.  
Earlier empirical research has indicated that elections and changes to the political leader 
of a country affect financial markets, bringing lower returns because of the uncertainty 
around future policy. However, this study, which is based on larger sample of countries than 
earlier inquiries, finds little support for that assertion. Still, the analysis conducted above 
clearly establishes that periods of political change seem to be periods of increased 
uncertainty, reflected through higher volatility in financial market returns. Further, the 
empirical analysis finds that this is even more so for developing countries, autocracies, and 
countries with a left-wing executive. In contrast, rich, democratic, and countries run by a 
right-wing executive, experience less volatility in relation with political leader change.    
The explanatory variables in the analysis has exclusively been dummies, and as remarked 
by Bernhard and Leblang (2006, 42): “Markets are likely to incorporate far more information 
than can be captured by a dummy variable for the electoral system or government 
partisanship.”. As markets mechanisms are obviously complex matters, affected by a wide 
range of variable and factors, capturing them all in one analysis seem unrealistic. This 
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highlights the need to tackle this question from different angles and by diverse academic 
disciplines, but also with alternative “tools” and methods. While this thesis has used a 
quantitative design, with two different statistical models, also other methods and models 
could, and should, be used in the future to guide us towards more decisive conclusions.  
 
6.1 Future research 
It is clear that both between countries and within countries, over time, financial markets react 
vastly differently to the prospect of and actual change to the political leadership; some having 
no reaction at all while other show clear positive or negative reactions. This analysis found 
indications of some systematical patterns in the data, for instance having a right-wing 
executive as incumbent seem to give lower levels volatility, and developing country’s seem 
to experience higher levels of volatility. Still, many questions remain unanswered; for 
example in regards to party change and earlier governmental experience. Later research 
should further investigate these, trying to uncover more about the link between political 
change and financial markets. Other aspects of economic and intuitional conditions should be 
explored, as possible explanatory variables. Also the possibility for interaction between these 
variables should be tested.    
Financial markets have developed tremendously from 1970 until 2004. It is an aspect 
that has not been addressed by this thesis, but could be a starting point for later inquiries. I 
have already noted that the assumed effect of shifts in partisanship could be different in 
particular eras, and that this could be due to the varying importance of party politics, but also 
to the changing institutional framework like the recently increased relevance of independent 
central banks. The latter also further highlights the need to look for interaction effects 
between the possible explanatory variables. Time specific effects could also occur out from 
specific events or trends, like terrorist attacks or financial bubbles; both factors that deeply 
affect both volatility and returns in the market.  
Another aspect is looking more directly at the investors’ behavior in these periods, 
through portfolio investment or other short-term investment measurements; directly testing 
the assumed link in the game theoretical model. Looking more directly at how both investors 
and politicians deal with policy uncertainty and financial market stability, obviously an 
important starting point for more qualitative research designs. Since “both word and actions 
matter in finance” (Santiso 2013, 243), something which is equally true for politics, both 
sides should be aware and know how their behavior is meet by the other player; something I 
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assumed to be true in game model but rarely is the case in the real world. Future research 
could also take a more empirical starting-point; with for instants focusing on content analysis 
of news outlets or similar places markets actors get information about potential new 
incumbents. Brunner (2009) also suggest a potential model of Bayesian learning to explain 
how investors update their believes with arrival of new information. A natural staring-point 
would be the policy uncertainty index introduced in chapter 1, which is based on newspaper 
coding. Expanding this line of research could answer some of the conflicting results in this 
and earlier research projects; for instance about when the investor learn about the leadership 
change.   
Measuring policy uncertainty is a difficult task, especially when looking across several 
countries at the same time. For example, a party that never before has been represented in a 
government might be a bigger source of uncertainty regardless of partisanship or policy 
preferences. On the same note, a well-established and respected incumbent might bring less 
uncertainty, than a “wild card” coming up in the 11th hour by popular demand. I only find 
anecdotal evidence for an effect of party change, but a control for earlier government 
experience was not included; in Denmark was a change to a party without governmental 
experience the only event that produced negative abnormal returns. Also, controlling for 
“personal” factors connected to the new incumbent might affect how market actors view the 
future, as work experience, education, and even age might mold this perception. Besley, 
Montalvo and Querol (2011) conclude that countries with leaders that have higher education 
have higher economic growth rates. Could financial actors and investors be affected by such 
personal characteristics of the incoming incumbent?  
Another possible angle to tackle the relationship between politics and finance is to turn 
the causal relationship assumed in this thesis, and look at how financial markets affect 
political change. By doing this, earlier findings on the field, and those from this thesis, on 
covariance can be tested critically. Also, it might help explain contradictory findings in 
earlier research; for instance could closer links between politics and finance in developing 
countries, argued by Santiso (2013), also be reflected in that finance shape politics and 
political events in these countries?  
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6.2 Final remarks 
The goal of this thesis has not been to build a model for predicting market behavior, but 
rather to make a contribution to the knowledge about how the world of finance and politics 
interact. This is a relationship that contains both conflict and mutual dependence. The conflict 
aspect has become very apparent with the recent financial crises, exemplified with the Angela 
Merkel description of the recent euro-crises in the literature review: “its a battle of the 
politicians against the market”. But also in earlier times have bankers and financial actors 
been viewed as a necessary evil by the political elites; for example deemed the only 
profession open to Jews in the Italian city-states where money and banks first appeared on a 
large scale in the middle ages. However, the price the Jews had to accept was social 
exclusions. For the political elite this was a convenient solution, since the state needed to 
borrow money in order to raise capital for expensive projects like wars and the building of 
churches and cathedrals, but for the Christians was lending money with interest a sin 
(Ferguson 2008, 34–38).61 Today are still nations and political leaders dependent on financial 
actors to raise capital; maybe even more than in the time of the Italian city-states. However, 
in times when financial actors often are described as ravenous wolves, it is important to 
remind ourselves on the important role financial market play in the modern economy; in 
some sense greasing and easing the way in which the economy operates.  
Also, as argued earlier, financial stability potentially brings with it higher economic 
growth and social development. Still, our common understanding of this dynamic is not 
complete, as the mixed findings from this and earlier research projects suggest. Political 
scientists addressing financial market behavior can help us get a more holistic picture. They 
can help with a new vantage point and new explanatory variables than those offered by 
classic economic theory. By also using models and theories related to cabinet formations, and 
electoral outcomes, it can help explain some of the many unanswered questions in regards to 
how and why financial markets react the way they do. Still, also other academic disciplines 
could play a bigger role in the discussion, like history, sociology, and psychology. All of 
these aspects are needed to build a clearer understanding about how politics and finance 
interact. Sometimes an outside view is needed, in order to ask “dumb” questions about 
excepted truth and theories.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61 Jews were neither suppose to lend money with interest, but the old testament have convenient get-out clause, 
which stops the lending between Jews but a Jew was allowed to lend out to others: ”Unto a stranger thou mayest 
lend upon usury; but unto thy brother thou shalt not upon usery.” (Deuternomy 23:20, cited in Ferguson 
2008:37) 
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As financial stability might be crucial for economic growth, getting an understanding of 
how and why markets react to political transitions could be important for policy makers and 
international financial organization, like the IMF and World Bank. In a world were capital 
flows easily across borders, foreign investors are an ever more important source of capital, 
especially for developing countries. There is no doubt, at least in my mind, that financial 
stability, with lower volatility and stable returns, are crucial in attracting these investments.  
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Appendix 1: Proof for equations 3.3 
So the investors invest if the payoff from investing is higher than the risk-free investment (r).  	   𝑝 𝑔 − 𝑐 + 𝑣𝐿 + (1− 𝑝)(−𝑐) > 𝑟	  	  
If we first multiply p into all parentheses we get:  	   𝑝𝑔 − 𝑝𝑐 + 𝑝𝑣𝐿 + −𝑐 + 𝑝𝑐 > 𝑟	  	  
The negative pc-term in the first parenthesis cancels out against the positive pc-term. Next all 
terms that do not include p are moved to the other side of the equations:  	   𝑝𝑔 − 𝑝𝑣𝐿 > 𝑟 + 𝑐	  	  
Then solving by dividing each side by g-vL and are left with equation 3.3: 	   𝑝 > 𝑟 + 𝑐𝑔 − 𝑣𝐿	  	  
This is then the condition for the value of p under which investors would choose to invest 
instead of taking the risk-free investment in the game of incomplete information (Figure 4).  
 
 
	   97	  
Appendix 2: List of events used in the event 
analysis 
Event id Country Event time Cumulative Abnormal Return T-test 
1 United States  1974m8 -17.03537369 -3.185798168 
2 United States  1977m1 -11.87014771 -2.736974716 
3 United States  1981m1 -0.019041538 -0.001937614 
4 United States  1989m1 0.126271963 0.009566536 
5 United States  1993m1 -2.037325382 -0.685396731 
6 United States  2001m1 -2.177987099 -0.312693566 
7 Canada  1979m6 7.38962841 0.482290447 
8 Canada  1980m3 -4.588811398 -0.231684417 
9 Canada  1984m6 6.432606697 0.563247859 
10 Canada  1984m9 -1.307240009 -0.177371904 
11 Canada  1993m6 -6.185710907 -0.606461942 
12 Canada 1993m11 5.154154778 0.860874653 
13 Canada 2003m12 -0.11278379 -0.031316895 
14 Mexico 1994m12 9.438695908 0.819876373 
15 Mexico 2000m12 -5.097086906 -0.327025354 
16 Colombia  1990m8 -4.919953346 -1.883755088 
17 Colombia  1994m8 -21.48906708 -0.68726927 
18 Colombia  1998m8 -26.38113785 -3.033568144 
19 Colombia  2002m8 1.296451569 0.054139201 
20 Brazil  1995m1 -68.88698578 -2.443718433 
21 Brazil  2003m1 11.32518673 0.78462553 
22 Chile  2000m3 -12.23477459 -1.496002197 
23 Argentina 1999m12 2.875302792 0.147085264 
24 Argentina 2001m12 73.97089386 0.654378355 
25 Argentina  2002m1 91.22723389 0.826762021 
26 Argentina  2003m5 16.34088135 0.650737405 
27 United Kingdom  1974m3 0.940287113 0.028149806 
28 United Kingdom  1976m4 6.754254818 0.600516021 
29 United Kingdom  1979m5 -16.87244606 -1.052639365 
30 United Kingdom 1990m11 5.966748714 0.350315034 
31 United Kingdom  1997m5 -0.638933063 -0.095822886 
32 Ireland  1973m3 -51.43922424 -2.736662149 
33 Ireland  1977m7 7.216499329 0.55375278 
34 Ireland 1979m12 3.354178429 0.143943384 
35 Ireland  1981m6 -7.623250008 -1.978292465 
36 Ireland  1982m3 -9.441374779 -3.812344313 
37 Ireland 1982m12 -9.445801735 -1.139290571 
38 Ireland  1987m3 -1.013619184 -0.153338328 
39 Ireland  1992m2 2.852867603 0.226001769 
40 Ireland 1994m12 4.544078827 0.90477252 
41 Ireland  1997m6 9.571011543 1.499832988 
42 Netherlands  1973m5 -22.67607117 -1.659448743 
43 Netherlands 1977m12 -7.214193344 -0.565599561 
44 Netherlands 1982m11 4.914915085 0.335058779 
45 Netherlands  1994m8 -1.551677465 -0.278695077 
46 Netherlands  2002m7 -14.8923378 -0.893912196 
47 Belgium  1992m3 -1.02288866 -0.199069366 
48 Belgium  1999m7 -0.454051256 -0.026781023 
49 France  1974m4 -5.739431381 
 50 France  1974m5 -5.0088377 
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51 France  1995m5 6.485940456 0.422770858 
52 Switzerland  1973m1 -5.552569389 -0.212993637 
53 Switzerland  1974m1 30.44581985 0.518112779 
54 Switzerland  1975m1 -6.066712379 -0.404891521 
55 Switzerland  1976m1 -0.566470265 -0.122413732 
56 Switzerland  1977m1 -0.203384519 -0.042886112 
57 Switzerland  1978m1 -3.758380651 -0.251817167 
58 Switzerland  1979m1 7.769836903 0.349862427 
59 Switzerland  1980m1 -0.033259511 -0.00542702 
60 Switzerland  1981m1 2.634624243 0.257029653 
61 Switzerland  1982m1 -0.685523093 -0.084173016 
62 Switzerland  1983m1 8.688489914 5.070088863 
63 Switzerland  1984m1 -3.724317074 -0.254166156 
64 Switzerland  1985m1 5.108448505 0.660626113 
65 Switzerland  1986m1 -11.2590723 -0.469459534 
66 Switzerland  1987m1 -16.87305832 -2.318588495 
67 Switzerland  1988m1 5.26433897 0.31075415 
68 Switzerland  1989m1 -1.520430088 -0.16143322 
69 Switzerland  1990m1 1.498604774 0.750610709 
70 Switzerland  1991m1 2.595857382 0.158459917 
71 Switzerland  1992m1 1.058899164 0.044775989 
72 Switzerland  1993m1 8.606996536 3.357171774 
73 Switzerland  1994m1 6.162146091 0.71999532 
74 Switzerland  1995m1 -1.472520947 -0.74662149 
75 Switzerland  1996m1 3.766096115 0.587023735 
76 Switzerland  1997m1 4.482841492 0.263291359 
77 Switzerland  1998m1 11.85149193 1.728397131 
78 Switzerland  1999m1 -0.560647488 -0.036001917 
79 Switzerland  2000m1 -5.976012707 -0.27937144 
80 Switzerland  2001m1 -6.088134766 -8.284481049 
81 Switzerland  2002m1 3.944160461 0.831847668 
82 Switzerland  2003m1 -13.87052345 -1.565264821 
83 Switzerland  2004m1 5.805597305 0.463563383 
84 Spain 1975m11 11.33670139 0.497243315 
85 Spain  1976m7 -6.337704182 -0.599773169 
86 Spain  1981m2 13.17080784 1.135047793 
87 Spain 1982m12 2.993716955 0.45354718 
88 Spain  1996m5 10.45022964 3.176607132 
89 Spain  2004m4 -5.139313221 -0.313651085 
90 Portugal  1996m3 9.798309326 0.935023785 
91 Poland 1995m12 12.24040127 0.21667929 
92 Austria  1983m5 8.751110077 0.638915241 
93 Austria  1986m6 -17.44739723 -1.584892273 
94 Austria  1997m1 8.798648834 2.799142599 
95 Austria  2000m2 1.336537361 0.063451499 
96 Hungary 1993m12 56.75032043 0.568857014 
97 Hungary  1994m7 -7.349236488 -0.269745678 
98 Hungary  1998m7 -14.0176096 -0.258032918 
99 Hungary  2002m5 -13.01396942 -0.448878527 
100 Hungary  2004m9 7.454462051 1.546947837 
101 Czech Republic 1997m12 -16.89032555 -1.112269044 
102 Czech Republic  1998m7 -13.42356205 -0.264614075 
103 Czech Republic  2002m7 17.53212547 0.339765757 
104 Czech Republic  2004m7 -2.762745857 -0.528798819 
105 Italy  1973m7 113.3735809 0.438715279 
106 Italy 1974m11 -17.57364082 -0.752585769 
107 Italy  1976m7 18.79896545 1.433004975 
108 Italy  1979m8 -30.6953125 -5.340168953 
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109 Italy 1980m10 29.42644119 0.516445637 
110 Italy  1981m6 -39.71090317 -0.895459175 
111 Italy 1982m11 -10.36270332 -0.761629403 
112 Italy  1983m8 9.218436241 0.458923191 
113 Italy  1987m4 -5.457622528 -0.223737702 
114 Italy  1987m7 -15.85604095 -0.966829121 
115 Italy  1988m4 -6.401402473 -0.578584015 
116 Italy  1989m7 13.50462914 1.153518796 
117 Italy  1992m6 -12.88641262 -1.566855431 
118 Italy  1993m4 22.14781189 0.635403335 
119 Italy  1994m5 1.871997356 0.063554324 
120 Italy  1995m1 -2.07905817 -0.10865622 
121 Italy  1996m5 18.8044281 0.95823878 
122 Italy 1998m10 1.33155632 0.065625995 
123 Italy  2000m4 -9.041202545 -0.348511845 
124 Italy  2001m6 -4.468202114 -3.707275867 
125 Croatia 1999m11 20.06210518 0.605538666 
126 Croatia  2000m2 39.14373779 0.989661157 
127 Slovenia  2000m5 0.986603975 0.414669454 
128 Slovenia 2000m11 -0.638651371 -0.048690449 
129 Slovenia 2002m12 22.05130768 0.449379176 
130 Slovenia 2004m11 31.3584156 1.851414919 
131 Greece  1989m7 2.299920559 0.082630202 
132 Greece 1989m10 32.81167221 0.454666555 
133 Greece 1989m11 -8.296373367 -0.699471056 
134 Greece  1990m4 55.67039108 0.737850547 
135 Greece 1993m10 -0.416842699 -0.039886307 
136 Greece 1995m11 -3.753988743 -0.264004737 
137 Greece  1996m1 13.96925735 1.198565841 
138 Greece  2004m3 2.854737043 0.17454356 
139 Romania 2000m12 5.551849365 0.165641531 
140 Russian Federation  2000m1 48.84041977 0.956942499 
141 Lithuania  2003m2 14.05085182 30.99110794 
142 Lithuania  2004m4 -8.663981438 -0.383788347 
143 Lithuania  2004m7 -8.915401459 -0.743281841 
144 Finland  1981m9 0.487135649 0.0887205 
145 Finland  1994m3 -9.116874695 -0.765900016 
146 Finland  2000m3 2.806577682 0.073845759 
147 Sweden 1976m10 -10.13141727 -0.518088341 
148 Sweden 1978m10 -8.052678108 -0.281184047 
149 Sweden 1979m10 0.652237296 0.160880923 
150 Sweden 1982m10 17.16235733 2.708728075 
151 Sweden  1986m3 6.980099678 0.212980866 
152 Sweden 1991m10 -8.231642723 -2.603752136 
153 Sweden 1994m10 -0.762996197 -0.050386321 
154 Sweden  1996m3 8.294066429 1.049593925 
155 Norway 1989m10 -6.592512131 -1.085291147 
156 Norway 1990m11 -28.58466911 -0.885456264 
157 Norway 1996m10 7.380232811 0.188285902 
158 Norway 1997m10 -8.70457077 -0.311557055 
159 Norway  1998m8 -31.90091133 -1.169305086 
160 Norway  1998m9 -46.81693268 -2.544957161 
161 Norway  2000m3 -1.15037775 -0.180531397 
162 Norway 2001m10 -1.077046394 -0.04133714 
163 Denmark 1972m10 33.30015564 1.118352652 
164 Denmark 1973m12 22.49912643 0.197731391 
165 Denmark  1975m2 0.306905508 0.043376077 
166 Denmark  1982m9 -2.488300323 -0.366912991 
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167 Denmark  1993m1 9.550087929 0.563626289 
168 Denmark 2001m11 0.845968246 0.119368814 
169 Iceland  2004m9 -1.226670742 -0.031268101 
170 Kenya 2002m12 48.35674286 1.492529273 
171 South Africa  1994m5 7.643694878 0.757729828 
172 South Africa  1999m6 11.02065086 3.188982964 
173 Morocco  1999m7 11.51216125 1.299428821 
174 Turkey  1991m6 -45.26390839 -1.123334289 
175 Turkey 1991m11 31.59205246 0.325428218 
176 Turkey  1993m5 64.11026001 1.335169673 
177 Turkey  1993m6 -6.688858509 -0.108296447 
178 Turkey  1996m3 22.34617996 0.62549293 
179 Turkey  1996m6 -10.1953392 -0.209991604 
180 Turkey  1997m6 -0.67761898 -0.020002427 
181 Turkey  1999m1 32.27839661 0.272910386 
182 Turkey 2002m11 -5.455679893 -0.167920068 
183 Turkey  2003m3 -45.30537796 -0.723988533 
184 Israel 1995m11 3.004998922 0.167255506 
185 Israel  1996m6 -8.604847908 -1.312861085 
186 Israel  1999m7 -10.71757412 -0.841924369 
187 Israel  2001m3 -3.608749628 -0.150749922 
188 China  2003m3 9.765897751 2.073702812 
189 Taiwan  1975m4 29.00654602 0.495544344 
190 Taiwan  1978m5 7.814853191 0.311217934 
191 Taiwan  1988m1 1.976272583 0.021767339 
192 Taiwan  2000m5 -16.00020981 -0.810689151 
193 Korea, Rep. 1979m10 15.26013851 1.146589518 
194 Korea, Rep.  1980m8 8.161103249 1.533780932 
195 Korea, Rep.  1988m2 -5.36220932 -0.09511748 
196 Korea, Rep.  1993m2 -4.098685265 -0.293217182 
197 Korea, Rep.  1998m2 33.33041382 0.304158539 
198 Korea, Rep.  2003m2 -18.78778839 -0.772190571 
199 Japan  1972m7 7.381485462 3.945383787 
200 Japan 1974m12 4.996453285 0.270240486 
201 Japan 1976m12 0.789833546 0.039731737 
202 Japan 1978m12 3.516834974 0.556719005 
203 Japan  1980m6 -4.182878494 -1.357097745 
204 Japan  1980m7 -1.137020469 -0.264032751 
205 Japan 1982m11 10.53072548 1.168839693 
206 Japan 1987m11 -18.71697998 -0.953288615 
207 Japan  1989m6 -0.518007874 -0.040716268 
208 Japan  1989m8 3.722144127 0.374729335 
209 Japan 1991m11 -7.84952879 -0.344658226 
210 Japan  1993m8 4.375745296 0.605198383 
211 Japan  1994m4 10.1161499 0.931468427 
212 Japan  1994m6 0.211905956 0.010451179 
213 Japan  1996m1 0.505779743 0.03485702 
214 Japan  1998m7 3.830654144 0.311040729 
215 Japan  2000m4 -11.50703621 -0.462783098 
216 Japan  2001m4 8.590193748 0.372639269 
217 India  1977m3 -3.474354267 -1.757254004 
218 India  1979m7 -23.67336082 -0.630064607 
219 India  1980m1 -28.60652161 -0.538490593 
220 India 1984m10 3.741204262 0.278833359 
221 India 1989m12 -12.09199715 -0.639405131 
222 India 1990m11 -5.582876205 -0.49189049 
223 India  1991m6 7.675004482 0.722759247 
224 India  1996m5 18.43188477 1.141014099 
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225 India  1996m6 1.777782202 0.087134086 
226 India  1997m4 8.031837463 0.401530474 
227 India  1998m3 11.74007416 0.480164766 
228 India  2004m5 -16.3344574 -0.628352165 
229 Bangladesh  1996m3 14.7236824 0.940327942 
230 Bangladesh  1996m6 22.71019363 0.802094519 
231 Bangladesh  2001m7 -14.00878334 -1.185626268 
232 Bangladesh 2001m10 -5.726107121 -0.737783372 
233 Sri Lanka  1989m1 29.51224136 0.952891886 
234 Sri Lanka  1993m5 -12.26799965 -0.396407157 
235 Sri Lanka 1994m11 -15.72175789 -0.88526988 
236 Thailand 1977m10 12.4164381 0.229336113 
237 Thailand 1977m11 15.03060913 0.27535373 
238 Thailand  1980m3 -8.450213432 -0.811249554 
239 Thailand  1988m8 -20.62140274 -2.180191755 
240 Thailand  1991m3 8.880431175 0.355310708 
241 Thailand  1992m4 -9.814386368 -0.316843092 
242 Thailand  1992m6 2.487781048 0.062524445 
243 Thailand  1992m9 26.59468651 0.928698838 
244 Thailand  1995m7 -19.18826485 -1.037283897 
245 Thailand 1996m12 -9.139986992 -4.485490322 
246 Thailand 1997m11 -15.42194176 -1.317130566 
247 Thailand  2001m2 33.43160629 1.122476459 
248 Malaysia 2003m10 0.019901276 0.001050835 
249 Indonesia  1998m5 -14.49065399 -0.404100776 
250 Indonesia 1999m10 2.140153408 0.095530778 
251 Indonesia  2001m7 18.88358688 1.177302003 
252 Indonesia 2004m10 14.14378929 2.933462143 
253 Australia 1975m11 6.425783157 0.334049672 
254 Australia  1983m3 6.048571587 0.26209712 
255 Australia 1991m12 -4.550917625 -1.00654006 
256 Australia  1996m3 -0.794686973 -0.088051878 
257 New Zealand 1972m12 11.52167988 3.159963846 
258 New Zealand  1974m9 -15.20600128 -0.677317619 
259 New Zealand 1975m12 8.030794144 2.473737717 
260 New Zealand  1984m7 -23.51934242 -7.523786545 
261 New Zealand  1989m8 15.32774067 0.209553927 
262 New Zealand  1990m9 -23.53616905 -2.737900496 
263 New Zealand 1990m10 -23.24358749 -2.235980511 
264 New Zealand 1997m12 -13.08468246 -1.714522362 
265 New Zealand 1999m12 2.358695507 0.391407609 
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Appendix 3: List of events due to natural 
death of the sitting incumbent 
 
Country Leader Month of death Nature of death 
China Deng Xiaoping 1997m2 Parkinson’s disease 
France Georges Pompidou 1974m4 Cancer 
Hungary Josef Antall 1993m12 Lymphatic cancer 
Japan Keizo Obuchi 2000m4 Stroke 
Morocco Hassan II 1999m7 Heart attack 
New Zealand Norman Kirk 1974m8 Heart attack 
Spain Francisco Franco 1975m10 Heart failure 
Taiwan Chiang Kai-Shek 1975m4 Heart attack 
Taiwan Chiang Ching-Kuo 1988m1 Heart attack 
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Appendix 4: Alternative GARCH-
specifications 
ARCH-in-mean 
Sample: 1970m1 - 2004m12, but with gaps            Number of obs   =     13685 
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(5)    =   1215.03 
Log pseudolikelihood = -43647.82                   Prob > chi2     =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Semirobust 
         ret |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ret          | 
     retMSCI |   .4976602   .0163121    30.51   0.000     .4656892    .5296313 
 change_gold |  -.0075183   .0040431    -1.86   0.063    -.0154425     .000406 
  change_oil |   .0198895   .0252354     0.79   0.431     -.029571    .0693499 
event_window |    .331312   .2225357     1.49   0.137    -.1048501     .767474 
       _cons |   .3034723   .0683793     4.44   0.000     .1694514    .4374932 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ARCHM        | 
      sigma2 |   .0083482    .001296     6.44   0.000      .005808    .0108884 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
HET          | 
event_window |   .9756023   .4975138     1.96   0.050     .0004932    1.950711 
       _cons |  -.2661649   .2768353    -0.96   0.336    -.8087521    .2764223 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ARCH         | 
        arch | 
         L1. |    .129218   .0155677     8.30   0.000     .0987059    .1597301 
             | 
       garch | 
         L1. |   .8584038   .0169391    50.68   0.000     .8252038    .8916037 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Model |    Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
           . |  13685           .   -43647.82     10     87315.65    87390.89 
 
 
GARCH (2,1) 
 
Sample: 1970m1 - 2004m12, but with gaps            Number of obs   =     13685 
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(4)    =   1118.49 
Log pseudolikelihood = -43651.87                   Prob > chi2     =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Semirobust 
         ret |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ret          | 
     retMSCI |   .5017007   .0164038    30.58   0.000     .4695497    .5338516 
 change_gold |  -.0081641   .0037676    -2.17   0.030    -.0155485   -.0007798 
  change_oil |   .0213452   .0246802     0.86   0.387    -.0270272    .0697176 
event_window |   .4004846   .2291983     1.75   0.081    -.0487358     .849705 
       _cons |   .5212542   .0584128     8.92   0.000     .4067673    .6357412 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
HET          | 
event_window |   1.094747   .5371415     2.04   0.042     .0419696    2.147525 
       _cons |  -.5409027   .3069676    -1.76   0.078    -1.142548    .0607428 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ARCH         | 
        arch | 
         L1. |   .1793989   .0219617     8.17   0.000     .1363547     .222443 
         L2. |   -.070789   .0264856    -2.67   0.008    -.1226997   -.0188783 
             | 
       garch | 
         L1. |   .8819067   .0170342    51.77   0.000     .8485203    .9152932 
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Model |    Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
           . |  13685           .   -43651.87     10     87323.73    87398.97 
 
GARCH (1,2) 
Sample: 1970m1 - 2004m12, but with gaps            Number of obs   =     13685 
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(4)    =   1140.96 
Log pseudolikelihood = -43655.76                   Prob > chi2     =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Semirobust 
         ret |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ret          | 
     retMSCI |   .4996982   .0163182    30.62   0.000     .4677151    .5316814 
 change_gold |  -.0078769   .0039292    -2.00   0.045     -.015578   -.0001759 
  change_oil |   .0198434   .0244575     0.81   0.417    -.0280923    .0677792 
event_window |   .3993528   .2283378     1.75   0.080    -.0481811    .8468866 
       _cons |   .5269743   .0581338     9.06   0.000     .4130341    .6409145 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
HET          | 
event_window |   1.077922   .4678509     2.30   0.021     .1609509    1.994893 
       _cons |  -.0786847   .2850763    -0.28   0.783     -.637424    .4800546 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ARCH         | 
        arch | 
         L1. |   .1662829   .0231572     7.18   0.000     .1208955    .2116703 
             | 
       garch | 
         L1. |   .4743197   .1620184     2.93   0.003     .1567694      .79187 
         L2. |   .3446292    .146532     2.35   0.019     .0574318    .6318266 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Model |    Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
           . |  13685           .   -43655.76     10     87331.52    87406.76 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
GARCH (2,2) 
 
Sample: 1970m1 - 2004m12, but with gaps            Number of obs   =     13685 
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(4)    =   1083.28 
Log pseudolikelihood = -43595.52                   Prob > chi2     =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Semirobust 
         ret |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ret          | 
     retMSCI |   .4954785   .0157613    31.44   0.000     .4645869    .5263701 
 change_gold |  -.0084588   .0036178    -2.34   0.019    -.0155496   -.0013681 
  change_oil |   .0215836   .0233811     0.92   0.356    -.0242424    .0674097 
event_window |   .4079142   .2242213     1.82   0.069    -.0315515    .8473799 
       _cons |   .4965791   .0540441     9.19   0.000     .3906546    .6025035 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
HET          | 
event_window |   3.246463   .8415436     3.86   0.000     1.597068    4.895858 
       _cons |  -5.489365          .        .       .            .           . 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ARCH         | 
        arch | 
         L1. |   .1572069   .0510966     3.08   0.002     .0570593    .2573545 
         L2. |  -.1541018   .0489556    -3.15   0.002    -.2500529   -.0581506 
             | 
       garch | 
         L1. |   1.762409   .0885288    19.91   0.000     1.588896    1.935922 
         L2. |  -.7657427   .0863552    -8.87   0.000    -.9349958   -.5964896 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Model |    Obs    ll(null)   ll(model)     df          AIC         BIC 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
           . |  13685           .   -43595.52     10     87211.03    87286.27 
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Appendix 5: Stata code 
This appendix summarizes the most important Stata-codes used in this thesis. 
 
/*****EVENT STUDY ANALYSIS*******/ 
 
/*Open Archigos, drop leaders before 1970 and make variable counting number of changes*/ 
drop if eoutdate<date("19700101","YMD") 
by cow: gen eventcount=_N 
/* making new dataset with only country code and number of events*/ 
by cow: keep if _n==1 
sort cow 
keep cow eventcount 
save eventcount 
 
/*Open stock data*/ 
drop if ret==. 
drop if retMSCI==. /*Remove missing*/ 
sort cow 
merge cow using eventcount /*Merge with dataset made above*/ 
tab _merge 
keep if _merge==3 /*keep only merged data*/ 
drop _merge 
expand eventcount /*make copy of observations based on the number of event*/ 
drop eventcount 
sort cow time 
by cow time: gen set=_n /*make variable to merge with the leader data*/ 
sort cow set 
save stockdata2 
 
/*Open the original Archigos data*/ 
by cow: gen set=_n 
sort cow set 
save eventdates2 
 
 
/*Open stockdata2*/ 
merge cow set using eventdates2 
keep if _merge==3 
drop _merge 
egen groupe_id=group(cow set) /*Making new variable that counts number of events*/ 
gen montly=mofd(eindate) /*making event variable*/ 
format %tm montly  
gen dif=time-montly /*time since event*/ 
/*making event and estimation window*/ 
sort groupe_id 
by groupe_id: gen event_window=1 if dif>=-1 & dif<=1 
egen count_event_obs=count(event_window), by(groupe_id) 
by groupe_id: gen estimation_window=1 if dif>=-25 & dif<=-2 
egen count_est_obs=count(estimation_window), by(groupe_id) 
replace event_window=0 if event_window==. 
replace estimation_window=0 if estimation_window==. 
/*dropping events that have too few months in event or estimation window*/ 
drop if count_est_obs<24 
drop if count_event_obs<3 
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set more off /*keeps stata from stopping after each window of output*/ 
 
/*estimate predicated returns*/ 
gen predicted_return=. 
gen r2=. 
egen id=group(groupe_id)  
forvalues i=1(1)265 { 
    l id groupe_id if id==`i' & dif==0 
 reg ret retMSCI change_gold change_oil if id==`i' & estimation_window==1  
 predict p if id==`i' 
 replace r2= e(r2) if id==`i' 
 replace predicted_return = p if id==`i' & event_window==1  
 drop p 
}   
/*generate abnormal returns*/ 
sort id time 
gen abnormal_return=ret-predicted_return if event_window==1 
by id: egen cumulative_abnormal_return = sum(abnormal_return)  
by id: egen average_abnormal_return=mean(abnormal_return) 
 
/*generate t-test and list of all events in the estimations*/ 
sort id time 
by id: egen ar_sd = sd(abnormal_return)  
gen test =(1/sqrt(10)) * (cumulative_abnormal_return /ar_sd)  
list groupe_id cow time cumulative_abnormal_return test if dif==0 
 
/*****Making tables for event study*******/ 
/*table 5.1*/ 
sum r2  
/*Table 5.2*/ 
reg cumulative_abnormal_return if dif==0, robust 
reg cumulative_abnormal_return if event_window==1, robust 
reg average_abnormal_return if dif==0, robust 
reg average_abnormal_return if event_window==1, robust 
/*Table 5.3*/ 
reg average_abnormal_return if dif==0 & party_chage==1, robust 
reg average_abnormal_return if event_window==1 & party_chage==1, robust 
reg average_abnormal_return if dif==0 & party_chage==0, robust 
reg average_abnormal_return if event_window==1 & party_chage==0, robust 
/*figure 5.1*/ 
twoway (line abnormal_return dif in 8765/8767) (line abnormal_return dif  in 9322/9324) 
/*Table 5.4*/ 
reg average_abnormal_return if event_window==1 & cow==2, robust 
reg average_abnormal_return if event_window==1 & cow==230, robust 
/*Table 5.5*/ 
reg average_abnormal_return dummy_dem bankpol pr plurality if dif==0, robust 
reg average_abnormal_return dummy_dem bankpol pr plurality if event_window==1, robust 
reg average_abnormal_return cha_left cha_right if dif==0, robust 
reg average_abnormal_return cha_left cha_right if event_window==1, robust 
reg average_abnormal_return dummy_dem bankpol pr plurality cha_left cha_right if dif==0, robust 
reg average_abnormal_return dummy_dem bankpol pr plurality cha_left cha_right if event_window==1, robust 
/*Table 5.6*/ 
reg average_abnormal_return developing if dif==0, robust 
reg average_abnormal_return developing if event_window==1, robust 
reg average_abnormal_return developing dummy_dem bankpol pr plurality cha_left cha_right if dif==0, robust 
reg average_abnormal_return developing dummy_dem bankpol pr plurality cha_left cha_right if 
event_window==1, robust 
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/*this was done after each reg to get normality test*/ 
predict e, residu 
sfrancia e, boxcox  
 
/**********GARCH**********/ 
 
/*merged the stock data and leader data in the same way as the event study*/ 
/*Table 5.7*/ 
arch lnret lnMSCIret change_gold change_oil event_window, arch(1/1) garch(1/1) het(event_window) 
vce(robust) 
arch lnret lnMSCIret change_gold change_oil event_window post_event, arch(1/1) garch(1/1) 
het(event_window post_event) vce(robust) 
arch lnret lnMSCIret change_gold change_oil event_window party_change, arch(1/1) garch(1/1) 
het(event_window party_change) vce(robust) 
/*Table 5.8*/ 
arch lnret lnMSCIret change_gold change_oil event_window dummy_dem bankpol pr plurality, arch(1/1) 
garch(1/1) het(event_window dummy_dem bankpol pr plurality) vce(robust) 
arch lnret lnMSCIret change_gold change_oil event_window exe_left exe_right, arch(1/1) garch(1/1) 
het(event_window exe_left exe_right) vce(robust) 
arch lnret lnMSCIret change_gold change_oil event_window dummy_dem bankpol pr plurality exe_left 
exe_right, arch(1/1) garch(1/1) het(event_window dummy_dem bankpol pr plurality exe_left exe_right) 
vce(robust) 
/*5.9*/ 
arch lnret lnMSCIret change_gold change_oil natural_death, arch(1/1) garch(1/1) het(natural_death) vce(robust) 
 
/*To test for AIC, normality and autocorr, done after each arch-command*/ 
estat ic /*AIC*/ 
predict e, residu 
sfrancia e, boxcox /*Normality in residuals*/ 
xtregar e9, lbi /* Autocorr in residuals*/ 
 
/*******Robustness-test***********/ 
/*Making alternative event and estimations window code*/ 
/*-2,+2*/ 
sort groupe_id 
by groupe_id: gen event_window=1 if dif>=-2 & dif<=2 
egen count_event_obs=count(event_window), by(groupe_id) 
by groupe_id: gen estimation_window=1 if dif>=-42 & dif<=-3 
egen count_est_obs=count(estimation_window), by(groupe_id) 
replace event_window=0 if event_window==. 
replace estimation_window=0 if estimation_window==. 
/*dropping events that have too few months in event or estimation window*/ 
drop if count_est_obs<40 
drop if count_event_obs<5 
 
/*-1*/ 
sort groupe_id 
by groupe_id: gen event_window=1 if dif>=-1 & dif<=0 
egen count_event_obs=count(event_window), by(groupe_id) 
by groupe_id: gen estimation_window=1 if dif>=-17 & dif<=-2 
egen count_est_obs=count(estimation_window), by(groupe_id) 
replace event_window=0 if event_window==. 
replace estimation_window=0 if estimation_window==. 
/*dropping events that have too few months in event or estimation window*/ 
drop if count_est_obs<16 
drop if count_event_obs<2 
 
 
/*+1*/ 
sort groupe_id 
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by groupe_id: gen event_window=1 if dif>=0 & dif<=1 
egen count_event_obs=count(event_window), by(groupe_id) 
by groupe_id: gen estimation_window=1 if dif>=-16 & dif<=-1 
egen count_est_obs=count(estimation_window), by(groupe_id) 
replace event_window=0 if event_window==. 
replace estimation_window=0 if estimation_window==. 
/*dropping events that have too few months in event or estimation window*/ 
drop if count_est_obs<16 
drop if count_event_obs<2 
 
/*Mean return model*/ 
gen predicted_return=. 
gen r2=. 
egen id=group(groupe_id)  
forvalues i=1(1)265 { 
    l id groupe_id if id==`i' & dif==0 
 reg ret retMSCI if id==`i' & estimation_window==1  
 predict p if id==`i' 
 replace r2= e(r2) if id==`i' 
 replace predicted_return = p if id==`i' & event_window==1  
 drop p 
} 
 
/*EGARCH (1,1)*/ 
arch lnret lnMSCIret change_gold change_oil event_window, earch(1/1) egarch(1/1) het(event_window) 
vce(robust) 
 
/*ARCH-in-mean*/ 
arch ret retMSCI change_gold change_oil alt_event, arch(1/1) garch(1/1) archm het(alt_event) vce(robust) 
 
 
/*Different number of ARCH and GARCH-terms included*/ 
arch lnret lnMSCIret change_gold change_oil event_window, arch(1/2) garch(1/1) het(event_window) 
vce(robust) 
arch lnret lnMSCIret change_gold change_oil event_window, arch(1/1) garch(1/2) het(event_window) 
vce(robust) 
arch lnret lnMSCIret change_gold change_oil event_window, arch(1/2) garch(1/2) het(event_window) 
vce(robust) 
 
 
